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I. INTRODUCTION
A . BACKGROUND
Random Sampling for Extrapolated Deductions (RSED)
involves making an inference concerning a population based
on a simple random sample. The results of that sample are
then used as a basis for equitable payment across the entire
contracted service. As a simple example, suppose that a
sample inspection of services revealed 10% not performed.
The contracting officer would then estimate that 10% of all
services were not performed, and reduce the contract price
by 10%. While payment deductions for observed poor perform-
ance or nonperformance by service contractors is standard
practice, the extrapolation of deductions based on random
sampling to the general population is currently prohibited
by NAVFAC regulation. This policy has been under review in
recent years.
Interest in this technique is a result of the increasing
role that service contracts play in accomplishing the base
maintenance function and the subsequent strain placed on the
inspection force. As part of a move toward formulating Navy
policy, two activities were granted authority to use
extrapolated deductions in their Family Housing Maintenance
Contracts.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this research is to evaluate the field
use of random sampling for extrapolated deductions in Navy
maintenance service contracts. This is being done to
identify issues which should be addressed before general
authority is granted and guidance promulgated. In addition,
proposed NAVFAC statistical methodology is evaluated in
light of information obtained in the course of this study.
C. SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS
This study focuses on the procedures used to implement
the field testing of random sampling for extrapolated
deductions in Navy maintenance service contracts. Air Force
use of this contracting technigue is addressed to provide a
background and contrast to the NAVFAC effort. Experiences
of other service contracting organizations with
extrapolating deductions either within or outside the
Federal Government was not pursued. It is assumed that the
reader is familiar with the concept of simple random
sampling.
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A literature search was conducted to review regulations,
reports, industrial literature, and policy guidance applica-
ble to statistical guality assurance and service
contracting. Contact documentation and history was obtained
from the following organizations involved in the initial use
of extrapolating deductions:
1. Public Works Center, San Francisco, Ca; and
2. Public Works Center, Great Lakes, II.
Additionally, interviews were conducted either in person
or by telephone at the following organizations:
1. Public Works Center, San Francisco, Ca;
2. Public Works Center, Great Lakes, II;
3. Western Division, Naval Facilities Engineering
Command, San Bruno, Ca;
4. Public Works Center, San Diego, Ca;
5. Public Works Department, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey , Ca
;
6. Public Works Department, Marine Corps Air Station, El
Toro, Ca;
7. Vandenburg Air Force Base, Lompoc, Ca.
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION
This chapter identified the current status of NAVFAC
regarding the extrapolation of deductions in service con-
tracting and presents the objectives and methodologies of
this study. Chapter II puts the study into perspective with
a discussion of the maintenance service contracting environ-
ment. Chapter III traces the historical development of
statistical quality assurance techniques and their applica-
tion to service contracting. Chapter IV examines random
sampling, NAVFAC policy concerning RSED, and two statistical
approaches that have received consideration as a basis for
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extrapolating deductions in NAVFAC service contracts.
Chapter V presents findings and conclusions resulting from
an evaluation of two activities implementation of
extrapolated deductions in their family housing maintenance
contracts. Finally, Chapter VI lists recommendations for
the general use of extrapolating deductions and makes
suggestions for future research.
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II. MAINTENANCE SERVICE CONTRACTING ENVIRONMENT
A . BACKGROUND
A Maintenance Service Contract (MSC) , commonly referred
to as simply a service contract, calls for a contractor's
time and effort rather than a finished product. Service
contracts are funded by the organization having budgeted
responsibility for the services acquired. Examples of
service contracts include refuse collection, guard services,
grounds maintenance, pest control, and family housing
maintenance. A MSC is normally entered into for a one year
period with an option to extend for two additional one year
periods. However, extensions to the contract cannot exceed
the fifth anniversary of contract award. [Ref. 1]
While not a critical distinction for purposes of this
paper, a MSC is one category of a Facility Support Contract.
The other category is a Maintenance Construction Contract.
Due to the nonrepetitive nature of construction and the
higher degree of importance associated with each unit of
work, they are not normally amenable to statistical quality
assurance and will not be a focus of this study.
Facility Support Contracts are designed to accomplish
the maintenance and repair of real property facilities.
They can best be thought of as an extension of the base
public works force, and in fact replace the in-house forces
12
where a decision has been made to contract out a function
previously performed by Public Works.
Service contracts are almost exclusively of the fixed
price type. It is the belief of NAVFAC that fixed price
contracts force contractors to perform efficiently. Where
uncertainty of workload precludes a firm fixed price,
Indefinite Quantity contracts are awarded on the basis of
firm unit prices for an estimated workload. This study
encountered the extrapolation of deductions being applied
only to firm fixed price contracts, however the technique is
also applicable to firm unit prices. [Ref. 1]
B. TREND TOWARDS SERVICE CONTRACTING
Service contracting in the public sector gained
attention in 1954 when, in his first budget message to
Congress, President Eisenhower said: [Ref. 2]
This budget marks the beginning of a movement to shift to
. . . private enterprise Federal activities which can be
more efficiently carried on that way.
This was followed by Bureau of the Budget Bulletin 55-4
which implemented the stated policy as follows: [Ref. 3]
It is the general policy of the administration that the
Federal Government will not start or carry on any commer-
cial activity to provide a service or product for its own
use if such service or product can be produced from
private enterprise through ordinary business channels.
Exceptions to this policy shall be made by the head of the
agency only where it is clearly demonstrated in each case
that it is not in the public interest to procure such
products or services from private enterprise.
Today's policy comes from OMB Circular A-76, issued in
1966 and further revised in 1967, 1979 and 1983. It
13
basically states that whenever a commercial activity is
Federally operated, the cost of operation should be compared
to the cost of contracting to determine who should do the
work. A commercial activity (CA) is defined as a product or
service obtainable from a commercial source. [Ref. 4]
Although it has been federal policy to contract out
commercial functions since the 1950s, the program was
largely ignored until the 1979 revision of A-76 [Ref. 5] . A
key element of that version reguired government forces to
submit a "firm bid" based on a clear Statement of Work
(SOW) . Contractors would also bid on the requirements
contained in the SOW. Thus the open market would determine
the contracting decision. Award would be to the lowest
responsible bidder if under the government estimate by 10%.
To ensure that the government estimate was properly
prepared, it was subject to approval by the Naval Audit
Service [Ref. 6] .
Thus, the fact that DODI 4100.3 3 reguired a complete
review of all CA functions and a compliance system was in
place set the stage for a number of functions formally
performed by Public Works to be contracted out.
Data compiled in January 1982 showed that 60% of all
functions reviewed shifted to contract, at an overall cost
savings of 19%. Of all NAVFAC functions studied, the areas
of transportation, grounds maintenance, building mainte-
nance, and janitorial service accounted for 82% of the total
14
[Ref. 7]. The next few years will undoubtedly see conver-
sions occur at an ever increasing rate as the great majority
of reviews are completed.
C. PERFORMANCE
Service contracts, while not directly mission related,
are usually of great concern to the activity commanding
officer. Visible lack of performance reflects directly on
his ability to effectively maintain the shore establishment
entrusted to his care. The result is acute command interest
in performance, an interest which is reflected throughout
the contracting organization.
Acceptable performance in service contracts is often
difficult to achieve. While a consensus of opinion did not
emerge during personal interviews, frequently cited reasons
included a lack of inspector resources, inadequate specifi-
cations, and a lack of enforcement techniques to motivate
the contractor.
D. QUALITY ASSURANCE
Quality Assurance (QA) is the procedure by which the
government verifies that it is receiving the services for
which it contracted and paid for. Quality Assurance
Evaluators (QAE) are responsible to the Service Contract
Manager (SCM) for actual monitoring of contractor
performance. The QA program is contained in the QA Plan,
it details how the QAE will monitor all aspects of a
15
contractor's performance, although it is not part of the
actual contract.
Several surveillance methods may be used as part of the
QA Plan. Those selected are based on the unique considera-
tions of an activity. Techniques currently in use are:
[Ref. 8]
a) One Hundred Percent Inspection—Appropriate for infre-
quently performed services or those of great impor-
tance, it is expensive and time consuming.
b) Planned Sampling—Designed to inspect some part of the
contract requirement. It cannot be used to make an
overall judgment concerning contract performance, but
is useful where performance in a particular area or
location is of interest.
c) Unscheduled Inspection—An impromptu check.
d) Validated Complaints—Originate with the customer.
The method is successful to the extent that customers
are aware of and can distinguish good performance.
While not recommended as a stand alone procedure, it
can be used to make payment deductions and require
rework.
e) Random Sampling—A statistically based procedure which
attempts to incorporate the best features of 100%
inspection and planned sampling. By inspecting a
sample representative of the entire population, it
allows a judgment to be made about overall performance
with a reduced level of inspector resources. A
properly constructed random sample may also be the
basis for extrapolating deductions. However, the
extrapolation of deductions is currently not allowed
by NAVFAC regulation and is the focus of this study.
E. ENFORCING PERFORMANCE
If the government accepts anything less than 100% of
contract bid requirements, the contracting officer must take
some appropriate action. Not to do so could indicate that
16
the government has overstated its requirements resulting in
an illegal contract.
Other than the routine identification of contractor
deficiencies, negative motivators form the basis of NAVFAC
approved techniques to enforce performance. Contract
actions other than payment reduction are all designed to
threaten and support eventual default for failure to
perform. The effectiveness of these techniques are
questionable because of the difficulty in sustaining
termination of a borderline contractor. In addition, the
prospect of extended litigation and interruption in services
must be considered. Conversations with contracting officers
indicate that "living" with less than acceptable performance
until contract expiration is the best of a bad situation.
It is reasonable to assume that a savvy contractor is aware
of the contracting officer's dilemma.
The most effective performance motivator currently
permitted is the withholding of payment for unsatisfactorily
performed services. Withholding payment assumes a strong
profit motive on the part of a capable contractor, a "fair"
contract under which reasonable profits are possible, and a
schedule of deductions which results in reduced profits when
exercised. Other possible contractor motivations such as
growth or maintenance of the workforce do not appear valid
in service contracting. Contractors generally do not staff
for a job until contract award, and a ready supply of
17
unskilled or semiskilled laborers makes adjustment of the
workforce an easy thing to do.
Current NAVFAC regulations allow deductions for work not
acceptably performed, unless the contractor is given the
opportunity to re-perform the work and does so satisfactor-
ily. If feasible, rework is preferable to deductions
because of the emphasis on performance. When taken, deduc-
tions are in accordance with individual bid items if an
Indefinite Quantity contract, or an agreed-upon schedule of
deductions for Firm Fixed Price contracts. However, this
contract action is limited by the fact that appeals boards
and courts uniformly hold "penalty" provisions unenforce-
able. Section 9-302.1 of the Navy Contracting Manual
applies: [Ref. 1]
No contract may provide for penalties for non-performance,
as such are legally unenforceable. However, a contract
may provide for liquidated damages, which is an advance
agreement between parties to a contract as the damages one
party will suffer if the other fails to perform . . . Note
that if a contractor does not perform work, it would be
improper to withhold payment for that work AND also charge
him the full cost of having the work done by others, for
that would result in the Navy having work done at the
expense of others.
Liquidated damages of 10% are assessed whether or not
the work is subsequently performed by the contractor to
compensate the government for increased administrative
costs. Where government forces re-perform the work, a 2 0%
liquidated damage charge is levied along with the full cost
of the government effort. [Ref. 1]
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Current NAVFAC regulations allow deductions for observed
defects only. The extrapolation of deductions based on
random sampling is prohibited [Ref. 8]. This policy
resulted from the lack of an acceptable statistical tech-
nique and questions as to the legality of extrapolated
deductions. However, NAVFAC has recognized the potential of
extrapolating deductions to further motivate the contractor,
or at least to better match payment for services received.
Therefore they have initiated efforts in recent years to
define a methodology under which extrapolation might be
authorized for general use. In support of this effort,
NAVFAC has authorized trial tests of extrapolating deduc-
tions in family housing maintenance contracts at PWC San
Francisco and PWC Great Lakes.
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III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF STATISTICAL
QUALITY CONTROL
A. EARLY EVOLUTION
Since man began to manufacture and produce products,
there has been concern over quality of output. As far back
as the Middle Ages, the medieval guilds insisted on
apprenticeships and required that those seeking to become
master craftsmen offer evidence of their ability. Such
rules were in part a form of quality control. In more
modern times, factory inspection and research, activities of
professional societies, and various regulations have sought
for years to assure a quality of output. Quality control
has thus had a lonq history.
On the other hand, statistical quality control is rela-
tively new. The science of statistics itself qoes back only
about 3 00 years. The theory of probability originated in
1654 when Pascal, a French philosopher and mathematician,
teamed up with Pierre Fermat to develop the new science.
Early applications were made in astronomy and physics, but
it was not until the 192 0's that statistical theory began to
be applied effectively to quality control. It should be
remembered thouqh, that even before the 1920' s, industry was
learninq to do thinqs more scientifically. Techniques such
as the GANTT chart, under principles developed by Taylor,
20
Gilbreth and others were a part of the movement called
"scientific management."
Walter Shewhart, of the Bell Telephone Laboratories, was
among the first to apply statistical methods to the problem
of quality control [Ref . 1] . Two other Bell System men,
H.F. Dodge and H.G. Romig, took the leadership in developing
the application of statistical theory to sampling
inspection. The culmination of their work being the now
well-known Dodge-Romig Sampling Inspection Tables. An
immense amount of work went into the preparation of these
tables, for at that time hand calculators were the only
available aid to speedy calculations. These tables were
published in 1941 [Ref. 2]. The work of Shewart, Dodge, and
Romig constitutes much of what today comprises the theory of
statistical quality control.
When this new inspection plan was proposed there were
many skeptics. Therefore, in the initial trials, after
performing sampling inspection, every lot was then inspected
100% to check conformity. The checks showed that sampling
did give good results and with much less time and money used
for inspection. After its initial application in the
central offices of Western Electric Company, the new proce-
dures were tried in the Hawthorne manufacturing plant in
Chicago, and proved a big success.
The rate of adoption of these newer methods were slow in
the United States. Professor Freeman, who was promoting
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statistical quality control at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, ascribed this sluggish response of the early
years to: (1) the conviction of American production
engineers that their principal function was to improve
quality control through advances in technology, (2) a
prevailing attitude that the laws of chance had no place in
a scientific field, and (3) the scarcity of adequately
trained industrial statisticians. In 1937, probably not
more than a dozen single enterprises in American mass-
production industry had introduced the new techniques into
their ordinary operations. [Ref. 3]
B. INFLUENCE OF WORLD WAR II
World War II overcame the initial coolness of American
industry toward statistical quality control. The armed
services began to enter the market as large consumers of
American output and, as such, had an increasing influence on
quality standards. A group of engineers from Bell Telephone
were brought to Washington to develop a sampling inspection
program for Army Ordnance. This step was made necessary by
the bottlenecks occurring at inspection stations during full
scale production.
The group from Bell faced a sampling problem of unprece-
dented size. It was necessary that all vendors be treated
fairly; it was necessary to get enormous quantities of ord-
nance material quickly; and it was necessary that arms and
ammunition be reliable and safe. The "acceptable quality
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control" system that was developed encompassed the concept
of protecting the consumer from getting unacceptably defec-
tive material, and encouraging the producer in the use of
process quality control. This was done by varying the
quantity and severity of acceptance inspections in direct
relation to the importance of the characteristics inspected,
and in inverse relation to the quality level indicated by
those inspections [REf. 4]. The same men also carried out
an extensive training program to acquaint qovernment person-
nel with the new procedures and tables. Many terms used
extensively today, most notably "producers risk" and
"consumers risk," had their origins in this original effort.
Wartime research in statistical quality control was
carried out primarily by the Statistical Research Group,
Columbia University, Applied Mathematics Panel, Office of
Scientific Research and Development. This research group
was organized in July 1942, and continued in existence until
September 1945. Members of the staff were drawn from
universities around the country. It advised and assisted
the Army and Navy on statistical aspects of problems arising
in their activities. Included in its contributions to sta-
tistical quality control was the preparation of the Navy
manual on sampling inspection by attributes [REf. 5]
.
Inspection by attributes requires that the inspected item be
categorized either as totally acceptable or not acceptable.
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Professor A. Wald, also of the Statistical Research
Group, developed the idea of sequential sampling. In
sequential sampling, the sample size is not determined in
advance. The sequential procedure is to inspect one item at
a time. The inspection is continued until enough cumulative
evidence has been gathered to either accept or reject a lot.
A pre-assigned risk of making incorrect decisions controls
the ultimate same sample size. This procedure allows very
good lots to be accepted quickly and bad lots to be rejected
quickly. It is only with lots of doubtful quality that
extensive sampling is required. This analysis was deemed so
important by the U.S. Government that it withheld publica-
tion of Wald's original paper until June 1945. [Ref. 5]
C. MILITARY STANDARDS (MIL-STD-105)
1. Development
In the post war period there were two systems of
sampling plans and tables, Army tables and Navy tables. The
procedures and tables were alike in general plan and struc-
ture but differed in a number of respects. In 1949, a basic
Military Standard, MIL-STD-105, was developed using material
from both service tables. Military Standard 105D, the
current version, is the outcome of a study by an American-
British-Canadian working group that sought to derive a
common standard for the three countries. MIL-STD-105D was
issued by the U.S. Government in 1963. In 1971, it was
adopted by the American National Standards Institute as ANSI
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Z1.4 and in 1973, it was adopted by the International
Organization for Standardization as ISO/DIS-2859. [Ref. 6]
2 . Acceptance Sampling
Acceptance sampling is the method of evaluating a
group of units, drawn from a production lot, in order to
determine the acceptability of the whole lot. It has been
widely accepted as the preferred method of acceptance con-
trol. MIL-STD-105D provides tables which facilitate the
implementation of an Acceptance Sampling by Attributes plan.
The focus of the plan is an acceptable quality level (AQL)
.
An AQL represents that quality level which, for purposes of
sampling inspection, can be considered satisfactory as a
process average. [Ref. 15]
In addition to an initial decision on an AQL, it is
also necessary in applying MIL-STD-105D to decide on an
"inspection level." This determines the relationship
between the lot size and the required sample size. Three
inspection levels are provided for general use with guidance
for switching between them.
For a particular sample size and AQL, the tables
will specify a reject number. When the number of defects in
a sample is equal to or greater than the reject number, the
entire lot is judged to be unacceptable. The sample size,
reject number, and AQL define an "operating characteristic"
curve for a particular plan. This curve depicts the
relationship between the actual defect rate submitted for
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inspection and the corresponding probability of acceptance
of such lots by the sampling plan. It is based on the
binomial distribution.
The nature of acceptance sampling is explained by
Siegmund Halpern: [Ref. 15]
Inasmuch as only a portion of the whole lot is inspected,
there is always a risk that the guality of the sample will
not reflect the guality of the lot. As a result, produc-
tion lots may, at times, undeservably be rejected and
faulty lots accepted. The former will be of interest to
the producer. He wants to minimize the risk of having
good lots rejected. This risk is identified as the
producer's risk. The risk of accepting bad lots in a
sampling scheme is, of course, the primary concern of the
consumer. This risk is called consumer's risk. The
method by which both the producer's risk and the
consumer's risk are Quantified statistically is by
constructing an operating characteristic curve.
Acheson Duncan also comments: [Ref. 9]
It is to be emphasized that the purpose of acceptance
sampling is to determine a course of action, not to
estimate lot guality. Acceptance sampling specifies
procedures that, if applied to a series of lots, will give
a specified risk of accepting lots of a given guality.
Appendix A illustrates how the sampling plans
contained in MIL-STD-105D are used. A typical operating
characteristic curve is also presented.
3 . Application to Air Force Service Contracting
Random sampling as a guality assurance tool for
monitoring contractor services was introduced to the
military by the Air Force in 1979 with AFR 400-28. MIL-STD-
105D provided the basis for the random sampling procedures
contained in the regulation. [Ref. 16]
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Originally designed to determine the acceptance or
rejection of manufactured lots, MIL-STD-105D was easily
adapted to the service contracting environment. Specific
instances of work could be judged "defective" or acceptable,
as required in attribute sampling, the same as a manufac-
tured part. Lot size was normally determined by the number
of services provided in a month, which corresponded to a pay
period. A major difference between the use of acceptance
sampling for manufactured items and evaluating service con-
tract performance is that a "lot" of services could not be
totally rejected if found unacceptable, since it had already
occurred. Therefore, contract actions based on the results
of acceptance sampling must recognize that some satisfactory
work has taken place for which the contractor is due
payment.
AFR 400-28 contains tables derived from MIL-STD-105D
that show acceptance and rejection numbers corresponding to
specified acceptable quality levels and sample sizes. The
acceptance number is the maximum number of defects allowed
before a sample is considered unsatisfactory. When the
number of defects in the sample exceeds the acceptance
number, contractor performance is deemed unsatisfactory and
contract payments can be reduced for the service provided
during the sample period.
Allowable AQLs are limited to those which appear in
MIL-STD-105D. AFR 400-28 calls for the establishment of
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reasonable AQLs as part of the original CA solicitation.
Thus contractors bid on performance requirements of less
than 100% for various services. Contractors are also
provided with the activities QA plan as an enclosure to CA
solicitations. This is done to inform prospective bidders
as to how the contract will be monitored and to help them
set up their own quality control program. It is not,
however, a part of the contract.
The extrapolation of deductions is a key feature of
AFR 400-28. When the random sampling method of surveillance
is used and the service is rejected, contractor payments may
be reduced in the same proportion for the entire lot as the
percentage of defects found in the sample. For example, if
a rejected sample disclosed that 15% of an inspected service
was defective, contract payments for the service may be
reduced by 15%. However if the number of defects found do
not equal or exceed the reject number, the services are
judged satisfactory and no deductions are taken.
Numerous problems have been experienced at the
activity level in implementing AFR 400-28. An audit con-
ducted by the Air Force Audit Agency in 198 5 to evaluate
quality assurance of base-level service contracts reported
the following findings: [Ref. 17]
a) for seven of twenty contracts reviewed, QAEs made
errors in the use of random number tables;
b) for fifteen of twenty contracts reviewed. QAEs did
not correctly use random sampling techniques due to
the complexity of AFR 400-28;
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c) for ten of twenty contracts reviewed. QAEs did not
properly apply accept/reject numbers due to the com-
plexity of the AFR 400-28 acceptance tables; and
d) sampling plans were not an effective means of deter-
mining contractor's performance as the plans used fre-
quently required the acceptance of services even
though the percentage of defects occurring in the
sample was approximately twice the defect rate per-
mitted in the contract.
The Air Force is now investigating a simplified
random sampling process based on Indifference Quality
Levels. In such a plan, the government and the contractor
equally share in the probability of acceptance or rejection
at a specified quality level [Ref. 17],
4. Navy Rejection of MIL-STD-105D
NAVFAC service contracts are written requiring 100%
performance. Thus the Navy is more interested in a statis-
tical methodology which will provide information as to
actual contract performance rather than the accept/reject
hypothesis testing of MIL-STD-105D.
A random sampling procedure was designed by NAVFAC
in 1979 to determine the level of contractor performance.
Published in the MO-327 [Ref. 8], which is the Navy equiva-
lent of AFR 400-28, it was not intended to be a statistical
basis for extrapolating deductions. The sampling plan
contained in MO-327 made use of an AQL that was not releasa-
ble to the contractor. This AQL differed from the one used
in MIL-STD-105D in that it was defined to be "tolerable"
performance rather than acceptable.
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The new contract surveillance technique was not
widely used. Conversations with contract administrators
indicated that this method of random sampling was hard to
understand, difficult to administer, and provided question-
able results upon which to base contract actions. Adding to
that the fact that extrapolated deductions were not
permitted, there remained little incentive for its use over
the more understandable planned-sampling technique.
In 1982, NAVFAC determined that the extrapolation of
deductions was appropriate as long as there was a degree of
confidence that deductions made were reasonable and not
construed as penalties. Their approach is studied in the
following chapter.
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IV. RANDOM SAMPLING FOR EXTRAPOLATED DEDUCTIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
Random Sampling for Extrapolated Deductions (RSED)
involves making an inference concerning a population based
on a simple random sample. The results of that sample are
then used as a basis for equitable payment across the entire
contracted service.
There are three reasons why the concept of extrapolating
deductions is supported by NAVFAC at this time: (1) it is
believed to provide extra motivation for the contractor
through the potential of increased deductions, (2) extrapo-
lation results in a better match of payment to services
received, and (3) the ability to extrapolate deductions
makes the use of random sampling more attractive as a
quality assurance tool. Given the current service
contracting environment, the ability to obtain acceptable
evaluation of contractor performance with reduced levels of
inspector resources would appear to be the predominant
issue.
The application of extrapolated deductions must be based
on a statistically valid random sample if a protest is to be
upheld. Most activities have had no experience with random
sampling and the guidance available is limited in value.
The next section looks at the considerations involved in
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A properly constructed random sample must ensure
that every possible sample of a given size has an equal
chance of being selected. Additionally, the process being
inspected must be homogeneous and produce defects in a
random manner. If this is not the case, a selection bias
may result which causes the attributes of the sample to be
different from the population. [Ref. 18]
This theoretical ideal, approachable in manufactured
lots, cannot realistically be attained in service
contracting. Some rooms are going to be harder to clean
than others. A bus service will be more likely to lag
behind schedule during certain hours of the day. If grounds
maintenance is provided at two different bases, a SCM would
not be happy with a sample which required 95% of the
inspections at one base. Thus, a sampling plan must be
devised which will "reasonably" represent the population of
services. A general rule would be to adopt a selection
method that will give every member of the population an
equal chance of being selected. In general, it is best to




The use of random sampling as a quality assurance
tool has inherent advantages over other inspection tech-
niques. The most obvious is that it provides a cost effec-
tive way of estimating the true level of contractor
performance. The fact that it may now be used as a basis
for extrapolating deductions makes it all the more attrac-
tive. Some other benefits of random sampling offered by
contract administrators are:
a) Requires less supervision of inspectors to make sure
they are using their time effectively;
b) is not susceptible to the predictability which may be
involved in planned sampling;
c) allows inspection of services to be transferred easily
from one inspector to another as no previous knowledge
of the contract is required.
NAVFAC has recommended that random sampling be
applied to service contracts possessing the following
characteristics: [Ref. 8]
a) Composed of a large homogeneous population of work
units,
b) individual work items not of a critical nature,
c) population size estimable,
d) inspector travel time not excessive.
3 Problems in Practical Use
Although there would seem to be numerous advantages
involved with the use of random sampling, even without
extrapolated deductions, its use seems to be very limited
within the NAVFAC community. Conversations with various
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contract administrators indicate that a lack of familiarity
with random sampling procedures, the complexity of writing
amenable specifications, and the confusing guidance in the
MO-327 are at the heart of their reluctance.
Probably the major impediment to instituting random
sampling plans, with or without extrapolated deductions, is
the lack of random sampling guide specifications for
individual contract types. Contract administrators are
either not willing or able to get bogged down in the details
of generating performance specifications and quality
assurance plans which properly incorporate random sampling.
For that reason, a great many services amenable to random
sampling are being inspected in a judgmental manner with
poor performance defined as an intolerable level of customer
complaints.
Janitorial services would seem to be a prime candi-
date for random sampling, yet interviews with contract
administrators revealed confusion and frustration where
attempts to write a suitable plan were made. This confusion
is easily understood. Questions exist over what the sampled
unit should be. Should it be individual rooms, groups of
rooms, buildings, or the specific acts of emptying ashtrays
and cleaning windows? Also, how is a representative sample
taken when conditions vary? Suppose that a BOQ building is
randomly selected for inspection. Can the percent of rooms
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found to be nonconforming be used as an indicator of overall
performance across the various buildings on base?
The design of random sampling plans is beyond the
scope of this paper. It is addressed because of its
discovery as an issue in the course of the research. Due to
the complexities involved with designing random sampling
plans and the lack of specific guidance, I would not be
surprised if the majority of random sampling plans which in
effect are of poor statistical validity. Contractors have
had no reason to challenge these procedures either because
they did not understand them, or because they were not being
used as a basis for deductions other than observed deficien-
cies. It should be anticipated that the extrapolation of
deductions will cause many of these sampling plans to come
under intense scrutiny.
Another impediment to the use of random sampling has
been the difficulty of generating random numbers and apply-
ing it to the population. Appendix B contains instructions
from the MO-327, which provides the guidance for random
sampling and tables for random number generation. Sample
generation by the manual method can be seen to be time
consuming and difficult to apply objectively. The tendency
would be for users to become frustrated with unusable
numbers and just resort to making up numbers on their own.
While NAVFAC recognizes the shortcomings of the random
number table and now advocates the use of computer programs
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for generating samples, they still recommend the use of the
tables where a computer and program are not available.
[Ref. 19] I believe that a computer based system is a




NAVFAC did not adapt the statistical methods of MIL-
STED-105D for surveillance of NAVFAC service contracts
because it called for acceptance of work at levels below
100%. Additionally, it allowed large deviations in the
observed sample above the AQL before it was rejected.
Reservations about the legality of extrapolated deductions
was also expressed. [Ref. 20]
In 1983, NAVFAC adopted the thinking that extrapo-
lated deductions would be an effective contractor motivator.
It was also thought that it would provide an additional
incentive for activities faced with scarce inspector
resources and increasing levels of contracted services to
adopt random sampling. The technique would be implemented
when a methodology was available to take deductions fairly,
with a high degree of confidence that they would not take
the form of punishment. Dr. Douglas Montgomery of the
Georgia Institute of Technology was hired as a consultant to
develop a statistical basis and procedure for extracting
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these deductions [Ref . 20] . Working with NAVFAC, a
methodology was ready for field use in 1984.
The ultimate form that extrapolated deductions will
take is still in doubt. NAVFAC is currently working on a
new statistical basis which is more in line with its
contracting philosophy. The elements of that methodology
will also be looked at in this chapter.
2 . Legal Considerations
The legal basis for extrapolating deductions is
derived from the Federal Acguisition Regulations: [Ref. 21]
If any of the services do not conform with contract
requirements, the Government may require the contractor to
perform the services again. . . . When the defects in
services cannot be corrected by reperformance, the Govern-
ment may . . . (2) reduce the contract price to reflect
the reduced value of the services performed.
A key concept is that the reduction in price must
correspond to the cost of the services. A case that applied
this ruling was Environmental Aseptic Services Administra-
tion and Larson Building Care Inc . [Ref. 22]. This case
involved an Air Force janitorial contract. The protesters
complaint was that sampled services, which in this case was
"cleaned rooms," subsumed several required tasks (e.g.,
aseptic floor, furniture, fixtures, drapes, and trash) . The
Performance Requirements Summary provided that if a task
fails, the room failed for the day. In other words, if the
contractor failed to clean the ashtrays, he would suffer the
same deduction as though he had failed to perform all
required tasks in the room. Thus the extrapolated deduction
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greatly exceeded the value of the one task not performed.
The GAO ruled in the case that the deduction was tantamount
to a penalty, and its inclusion in the Invitation for Bids
unnecessarily raises the governments cost and has an adverse
effect on competition.
Closely tied to the issue of reasonable cost deduc-
tions is the treatment of liquidated damages. The Federal
Acquisition Regulations state the following policy: [Ref.
23]
Liquidated damages clauses should be used when both (1)
the time of delivery or performance is such an important
factor . . . that the Government may reasonably expect to
suffer damage if the delivery or performance is delinquent
and (2) the extent or amount of such damage would be
difficult or impossible to ascertain or prove. . . . The
rate of liquidated damages used must be reasonable and
considered on a case-by-case basis. . . . Liquidated
damages fixed without any reference to probable actual
damages may be held to be a penalty and therefore
unenforceable
.
The Navy Contracting Manual, P-68, allows liquidated
damages to be assessed o FSCs at the rate of 10% of the
price of the service whether or not it is subsequently re-
performed. The extrapolation of deductions has caused some
confusion in this area. Do liquidated damages apply to the
estimated portion of unperformed work?
Original NAVFAC guidance indicated that the extrapo-
lation of liquidated damages was proper [Ref. 24]. Later
guidance called for liquidated damages to be applied only to
items re-performed, which would prohibit their extrapolation
[Ref. 19]. More recent discussions with NAVFAC indicate
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that the policy will be to take liquidated damages for
observed deficiencies, whether or not it is subsequently re-
performed.
The key question to be asked concerns the reason for
liquidated damages. If it is to compensate the government
for increased administrative costs associated with re-
inspection, then it is appropriate to apply liquidated
damages only in instances where the item is re-performed.
However, if the basis of the liquidated damages is to
compensate the government for the interruption of normal
activities associated with dirty chalkboards and unemptied
dumpsters, then re-performance is not a consideration and
the damages remain. Also, the damages associated with the
estimated portion of nonperformance would be just as real as
the inspector observed deficiencies. The fact that NAVFAC
now advocates that liquidated damages be applied for
observed deficiencies would indicate the latter as a basis.
Therefore, the extrapolation of liquidated damages would
appear defensible in court. The greater amount of deduc-
tions assessed would also act as an enhanced motivating
force.
Another important issue from a legal standpoint is
the implications of not obtaining a sample by procedure.
For example, suppose an inspector fails to obtain the sample
required by procedure. Does that invalidate the sample for
extrapolation purposes? From the standpoint of violating
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the procedure itself, apparently not. The GAO has ruled
that when regulations set out instructions clearly for the
benefit of the government, the agency's failure to comply
with it does not provide a basis for protest. [Ref. 25]
As far as the sample size itself, the government's
failure to select an adequate sample has been the basis for
upholding protests [Ref. 25] . However, that case involved a
sampling scheme which was part of the contract. NAVFAC has
no plans to make their quality assurance program a contract
requirement. Even in the case where a sampling scheme has
been included as a part of the specifications, the Armed
Service Board of Contract Appeals has ruled that a deviation
in sampling procedure is allowable where "no appreciable
difference in results occurs" [Ref. 26] . I agree with the
NAVFAC policy not to include quality assurance procedures in
the contract. The government must reserve the right to
remain flexible in this area. At the same time, contrac-
tually specified quality assurance would open up contract
administrators to numerous protests.
D. STATISTICAL BASIS FOR FIELD TESTING
1. Introduction
The statistical method devised by D.r Montgomery for
use in the NAVFAC field tests are easily incorporated into
tables amenable for field use. These tables require no
knowledge of statistics for application. However, a lack of
appreciation for the relationships which form the basis of
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the tables means that the potential for misusing them
exists. Lacking specific guidance, activities may unneces-
sarily increase their administrative burden in cases of
mismatched samples and populations. It should be emphasized
that the motivation behind extrapolated deductions is to
better match pay to services using minimal inspector
resources. This section looks at the statistical basis of
the field tests and discusses the various components upon
which the tables are based.
2 . Use of the Tables
Tables approved by NAVFAC for use in monitoring
service contracts and taking extrapolated deductions were
distributed to Engineering Field Divisions and Public Works
Centers in 1984. Guidance in use of the tables (see sample
tables in Appendix C) was provided by NAVFAC as follows:
[Ref. 24]
In order to use the tables, the user must first establish
the "Critical Performance Level" (CPL) which is defined as
the level of performance by the contractor that the
government considers to be adequate and is expressed as a
percentage. The CPL is established during the specifica-
tion writing phase and should be entered into the Perform-
ance Requirements Summary. For a given CPL and population
size, the tables give the user a sample size and a
Critical Number of Defects (CND) . The CND is the number
of defects in the sample that would signal poor contractor
performance and is the threshold for considering taking a
deduction based on a statistically estimated number of
defects. When the number of defects observed in the
sample equals or exceeds the CND, the number of defects in
the population is estimated by multiplying the population
by the percentage of defects found in the sample. When
the number of defects observed in the sample is less than
the CND, deductions will be taken for observed defects
only. . . . The Normal Surveillance Table will usually be
used for a new contract. The Tight Surveillance Table
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should be used if observed defects exceed two-thirds of
the CND for two consecutive months. The Reduced Surveil-
lance Table should be used if the observed defects are
less than one-third of the CND for two consecutive months.
Normally when Reduced Surveillance Tables are used, deduc-
tions will be taken for observed defects only.
Use of the term CPL (equal to 100-AQL) was NAVFAC's
way of stating that 100% performance was being contracted
for, but that a somewhat lower level would be tolerated
before adverse contract action would be initiated. The
inclusion of the CPL in the contract was NAVFACs first
concession in writing that less than 100% performance was
acceptable. This change in policy was made necessary by the
fact that the CPL was the key factor in taking extrapolated
deductions, and in the course of explaining deductions to
the contractor it would have become known anyway.
Opinion is mixed whether or not the CPL being part
of the bid package would lead to lower bids by contractors
planning to under-perform. The incentive to do so would
seem to be there. For example, if the CP1 was 9 0%, a
contractor could cut his bid by 10% and plan to only perform
90% of the work. If he could maintain his actual perform-
ance at 90%, he could avoid extrapolation 95% of the time.
Although he would have to rework observed deficiencies or
suffer the specific deductions, these would only be a small
percentage of the actual deficiencies which existed. The
result of all this would be a borderline contractor with
high administrative costs. This possibility points out a
weakness of including the CPL in the contract under this
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type of system. Limiting the CPL to the QA plan would allow
it to be changed at a later date if it became necessary.
It should be noted that the method approved is very
similar to that used by the Air Force. For a given perform-
ance requirement and population size, a CND (reject number)
is established at which time extrapolation can be applied.
The major procedural difference is that below the CND the
Navy would still deduct for observed defects, while the Air
Force did not. This difference was due to the Navy's basic
requirement being 100% performance.
3 . Mathematical Basis of Field Method
The mathematical basis of the tables used for the
field test is the normal approximation of the hypergeometric
probability distribution. The sample sizes shown in the
tables were calculated using the relationship of equation
(1):





n = required sample size
CPL = critical performance level
N = estimated population size
Z = normal one-sided z-statistic
W = width of the confidence interval = ( 1-CPL) /2
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The z-statistic is dependent on the confidence level
desired. For normal inspection the confidence level is 95%
and the corresponding z-statistic is 1.645. This means that
the resulting sample will ensure that the observed defect
rate is within the specified confidence interval 95% of the
time. Tightened inspection equals 99% confidence, while
reduced equals 90%.
4. Effect of CPL
The confidence interval (W) can be seen to be a
function of the CPL. It is perhaps easier to think of it as
one-half the allowable defect rate. Thus the greater the
CPL, the more narrowly defined is the confidence interval,
and the greater is the sample size required. This relation-
ship may be undesirable due to the lack of specific guidance
in setting CPLs. Contract administrators have interpreted
the CPL to be a level of acceptable performance from an
average contractor. Thus easily performed services should
rate a high CPL regardless of the importance of the service.
Because the confidence interval then becomes such a small
number, which is subsequently squared, it has an overriding
effect on the sample size. From the normal table (see
Appendix C) it can be seen that if the population estimate
is 1000 units of work, a shift in the CPL from 90% to 95%
would result in the required sample size being doubled.
If the confidence interval is going to vary
inversely with the CPL, a distinction should be made between
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"critical" services and those which happen to rate a high
CPL due to the ease with which they can be performed.
Perhaps the latter category could be inspected at a reduced
level of confidence. This would be consistent with the
efficient use of inspector resources.
The use of the CPL term in equation (1) is only a
best estimate of actual performance, which is what is
actually mathematically required to make the equation valid.
If the actual performance is less, the actual confidence
level achieved will be less. NAVFACs rationale for
accepting lower confidence levels when contractor
performance is below the CPL is that greater attention will
be focused on the contractor's performance by various other
methods. A plot of this relationship for a 95% confidence
level (normal surveillance) and CPLs of 90% and 97% is shown
in Figure 4.1, a population of 300 was assumed. It can be
seen that achieved confidence at realistic performance
levels still gives the benefit of the doubt to the contrac-
tor. Therefore, whether or not other actions are antici-
pated, very poor performance does not invalidate
extrapolation
.
5 . Effect of Sample Size
In Section C-2 of this chapter, the implications of
not taking the appropriate sample size was discussed.
Figure 4.2 shows a plot of the relationship between sample
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normal sampling and a CPL of 90% are assumed. Where actual
samples fall below the required sample, achieved confidence
gradually decreases. This is especially true where large
samples are involved. For example, if the sample taken for
a population of 500 was only half the required 82, achieved
confidence would still be in excess of 86%. It can be
concluded that failure to reach a designated sample is
probably not going to appreciably affect the results.
Therefore guidance on this matter should be promulgated to
avoid the situation of activities invalidating their samples
when there is no need to do so.
6. Effect of Population Estimate
Similar to the situation of not obtaining the proper
sample size is the almost monthly problem of not properly
estimating the population size. Analysis of the relation-
ship between confidence level and population size shows that
this situation is of almost no consequence. Take the case
where the estimated population is 500 units and the desired
confidence level is 95% (CPL = 90%, sample size = 82) . If
the actual population turns out to be 400, the resulting
confidence level will be 95.5%. At an actual population of
600, the original sample of 82 will still give a confidence
level of 94.7%! In fact, whenever the original sample size
is greater than about 30, the achieved confidence level
should be sufficient to support extrapolated deductions
using the original CND. Again, there is no guidance on this
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matter and activities may try to unnecessarily match sample
sizes to ultimate populations at the expense of manpower and
possibly statistical validity. It would appear to be the
case that in all situations where random sampling is appro-
priate, the original sample should be sufficient to support
extrapolated deductions or any other contract action.
7 . Operating Characteristics
The CND is calculated by determining the defect rate
which exceeds the CPL plus the confidence interval at the
specified confidence level. Equation (2) illustrates this
relationship:
CND = nm^Vm^u-a,, (2)
The application of equation (2) is equivalent to a
standard hypothesis test. The statement being made at a
normal level of inspection is that if the CND is reached, we
are 95% confident that the actual defect rate is equal to or
greater than the allowable defect rate.
Figure 4.3 contains an operating characteristic
curve for various CPLs. It can be seen that while this
methodology is biased toward the contractor, it does exhibit
higher levels of producer risk than MIL-STD-105D. A good
point of comparison is an actual performance rate of 85% and
a CPL of 90% (AQL = 10%) . The NAVFAC statistical basis will
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while the Air Force would accept it 85% of the time using
MIL-STD-105D (see Appendix A for MIL-STD-105D)
.
E. PROPOSED STATISTICAL BASIS FOR FUTURE USE
A problem with the statistical basis used in the field
tests, as viewed by NAVFAC, is that it did not allow for
extrapolation until contractor performance was below the
CPL. This implied that performance above the CPL was
acceptable. Yet NAVFAC is adamant that service contracts be
written for 100% performance. Thus, a new method for taking
extrapolated deductions is being developed by NAVFAC. It is
planned that when ready for field use, this method will
replace the method used in the field tests. This section
describes the characteristics of the new method as it
currently exists.
The proposed statistical basis for taking extrapolated
deductions in the future is more in line with NAVFAC 's
policy of contracting for 100% performance and taking
deductions where evidence of nonperformance exists. Code
named RSED V3 . , this methodology seeks to determine the
contractor's actual level of performance. Deductions are
then extrapolated without regard to a CPL. The concept of a
CPL is utilized to the extent that if a contractor's
performance does not meet the CPL, as determined by the ODR,
contract actions in addition to payment deductions are
indicated. These CPLs are to be included in the contracts
Performance Requirements Summary. [Ref. 19]
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RSED V3 . has not been finalized for field use. Prelim-
inary indications are that it will incorporate one basic
sampling level, although others may be added. The defect
rate determined by the sample is adjusted downward by a
specified "delta" depending on the observed defect rate to
determine a level appropriate for deductions. The use of
the delta ensures that the deduction rate will be less than
or equal to the contractor's actual defect rate 75% of the
time on a monthly basis, and approximately 90% of the time
over the annual contract term. The higher confidence level
associated with the contract term is felt by NAVFAC to be
the minimum necessary for which to base stronger contract
actions such as termination or not renewing options.
Appendix D contains the sample size and delta tables along
with a sample payment analysis reproduced from NAVFAC
documentation. [Ref. 19]
Like the model used for field testing, RSED V3 . uses
the normal approximation of the hypergeometric distribution
to determine sample sizes and confidence intervals. The
relationship used for calculating sample sizes is identical
to the field model except that different assumptions are











n = required sample size
W = .01 (a fixed value of 1% regardless of CPL)
P = .95 (a fixed value of anticipated performance,
not CPL)
Z = .674498 (normal z-statistic for 75% certainty)
N = estimated population size
Equation (3) can be rewritten as,
n = [.00462749 + l]" 1 (4)
N
The resulting sample size can be seen to be independent
of the CPL. It will yield an observed defect rate within 1%
of the actual defect rate 75% of the time, provided the
actual performance is close to the estimate of 95%. At the
end of the month, the observed defect rate is used as a
better estimate of actual performance to calculate a new
confidence interval. This new confidence interval is found
by solving Equation (1) for "W" . The new value for "W"
becomes the "delta" adjustment. Equation (5) illustrates:
DELTA = \P^l(l -£> (5)
where:
P = observed defect rate (ODR)




The "delta" is calculated with fixed values of "N" and
"n" so that one table which is a function of the observed
defect rate may be utilized. This simplification results in
deltas approximately one percent less than would have been
obtained using actual sample sizes and populations. It also
precludes the necessity of having a table for each possible
sample size and population! The delta in conjunction with
the ODR can now be used to estimate the true level of
contractor performance, and to determine a deduction rate to
be used for extrapolation. The following statements help
summarize the results of this methodology using an ODR of
10% as an example: "We are 75% confident that the true
defect rate is greater than the deduction rate of 8.62%
(ODR-DELTA) , : or for evaluating performance, "We are 75%
confident that the true performance level of the contractor
is less than 91.38% (100% - ODR + DELTA)."
F. COMPARISON OF THE TWO STATISTICAL BASES
1. Inspection Requirements
The proposed statistical basis will require greater
sample sizes to be inspected than the field version. This
is due to the fact that RSED V3 . seeks to ascertain actual
contractor performance within a tolerance of one percent.
Because extrapolation will be applied at all levels of
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performance under RSED V3.0, this small confidence interval
is deemed necessary by NAVFAC. Since the field version is
designed only to determine whether actual performance is
less than a "tolerable" level, it can be done with a smaller
sample at a higher level of confidence.
Another difference between the methods is the
greater flexibility allowed with the field version. Depend-
ing on inspector resources and contractor performance, SCMs
can direct inspection at three confidence levels with large
differences in inspection requirements. In addition,
different CPLs can be assigned to further adjust inspection
requirements within the different levels. However, the
large influence on inspection requirements exerted by the
CPL may cause some contract administrators to specify a
performance level lower than actually desired. Under normal
levels of inspection, specifying a 95% CPL over a 90% CPL
results in almost doubling the sample size. The potential
thus exists for contract performance requirements to become
a function of inspector resources.
Increased flexibility could be built into RSED V3.0.
This would have to be done by allowing different confidence
intervals, since the confidence level of 75% would seem to
be approaching a minimum. Specifying larger confidence
intervals would not change the ODR, which will be the basis
for contract actions other than extrapolation and remains
the best estimate of contractor performance. Also, the fact
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that straight line deductions exist in the Air Force where
contract specifications have not been met, implies that
NAVFAC is being unnecessarily conservative.
2 . Effect On Contractor Performance
It is reasonable to assume that the contractor will
be motivated closer to 100% performance under RSED V3 . .
However, most contract administrators feel that 100%
performance is unrealistic for most services, and expressed
the opinion that public works forces rarely performed at the
now specified CPL. The extrapolation of deductions at
performance levels which have been previously considered
satisfactory represent a source of increased risk to the
contractor which may be expected to result in higher bid
prices.
Bid prices may also be higher under RSED V3 . for a
more positive reason. The feature of extrapolating at all
defect levels means that there is a much closer match
between payment and services received. Contractors will not
have any incentive to underbid the contract with the goal of
performing at the CPL and avoiding extrapolation. Thus RSED
V3 . might result in more bids where the contractor is able
to make a fair profit at the reguired performance level.
Whether or not this results in higher overall bids depends
on the profit levels now being enjoyed by service
contractors.
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There seems to be a greater potential for an adver-
sarial relationship to develop between the contract
administrators and contractor under RSED V3.0. This is
because every observed deficiency would have ramifications
beyond its own merits. Under the field method, this wasn't
the case until the CND was reached. At that point there was
little room for sympathy because the contractor was perform-
ing at levels well below specified levels. Because the
quality of services is subject to some inspector judgment,
borderline cases under RSED V3 . may be dismissed as
inspectors carry the increased burden of identifying
discrepancies which will be the basis for extrapolation.
3 . Deduction Level
There are too many variables involved to try and
quantify the anticipated differences in deductions which
would be obtained using the two statistical methods. It
would be fair to say that the potential for higher deduc-
tions exists under RSED V3.0. The dichotomy remains that
when either system is functioning as intended, the deduc-
tions will be at a minimum.
A major difference between the two methods is the
treatment of discrepancies outside the random sample (e.g.,
customer complaints, planned sampling) . When deductions are
extrapolated, it is not correct to also deduct for deficien-
cies found outside the sample, as these would be
theoretically included in the extrapolated results. Since
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RSED V3 . extrapolates from the start, it is never
permissible to deduct for a customer complaint. The field
method would allow this deduction if the CND had not been
reached. An interesting result is that in services which
are customer oriented and a strong customer complaint pro-
gram exists, extrapolated deductions under RSED V3 . could
easily be less than what would have been obtained by
deducting for known deficiencies. This does not appear to
be a situation that the contractor can take advantage of.
Even if the services were not amenable to re-work, contract
actions other than extrapolation could be resorted to.
4 . Producer/Consumer Risk
Both the field version and RSED V3 . are biased
towards the contractor. The field version allows actual
defect rates to be approximately 1.5 times the CPL before an
even chance of rejection occurs and straight line extrapola-
tion is applied. Performance levels under RSED V3 . are
closely determined, but then a "delta" subtracted from the
ODR assures that the contractor will be overpaid in the long
run.
A normal approach to comparing the producer bias
inherent in any statistical techniques is the operating
characteristic curve. However, since there is no reject
number (CND) involved with RSED V3.0, a curve for it cannot
be constructed. It is safe to say that in either method,
the contractor is treated more than fairly. A theoretical
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even treatment would be to apply the ODR as a deduction rate
at any performance level. However, NAVFAC is not willing to
live with the idea that in any one month, the contractor has
an even chance of being overpaid or underpaid, least not at
reasonable inspection levels (confidence intervals)
.
5. Ease of Use
Both methods appear workable and of comparable
difficulty to implement and administer. However, under RSED
V3 . reguired sample sizes are specified for much narrower
population ranges. This increases the potential for
mismatched samples with actual populations. If clear and
simple guidance isn't promulgated which defines actions to
be taken when procedures aren't strictly followed, the
administrative burden could become excessive.
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V. SURVEY OF FIELD TESTS
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Purpose
The purpose of this survey is to identify general
issues which should be addressed before the extrapolation of
deductions is approved for general use. Although both of
the field tests involved family housing maintenance con-
tracts, the focus of this study remains oriented toward
general issues. Preferred methods for applying extrapolated
deductions to any specific contract type are outside the




The two activities involved in the field test are
Public Works Center (PWC) Great Lakes and PWC San Francisco.
Although the housing maintenance requirements of each
activity are similar, many differences exist regarding both
the circumstances of the contracting effort and the approach
taken to employ extrapolated deductions. Key differences
include CPL requirements, performance weighting, and the
method for classifying service work for bid and inspection
purposes.
Both maintenance contracts were initially written as
the basis for a CA review. In the case of San Francisco,
the contract ran for two years before approval to use
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extrapolated deductions was granted in July, 1985. Prior to
that time, random sampling had been conducted using the
procedures of MO-327.
At Great Lakes, extrapolated deductions was a part
of the contract from its inception in 1984 . NAVFAC provided
assistance in developing contract specifications, but the
QAP and related payment documents were generated in-house
from scratch. The methodology for taking deductions was
approved at the NAVFAC level before extrapolation was
allowed.
3 . Data Collection
The collection of quantitative data was made diffi-
cult due to the great amount of paperwork which is generated
over the course of administrating a service contract. I was
limited to using payment summary sheets because of the
fragmentary nature with which relevant information is
located within that paperwork. These summaries were not
directly comparable, so some information obtainable at one
activity could not be collected at another. One example was
an inability to determine the percent of rework accomplished
at Great Lakes. This prevented a deduction comparison with
RSED V3 . at that activity, which was done with the PWC San
Francisco data.
Data collection was focused in both cases on perform-
ance, inspection and payment history of service work.
Service work is normally customer generated and requires
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less than 16 hours to complete. It constitutes the largest
component of work performed under a housing maintenance
contract, approximately half. Random sampling was applied
to service work for the purpose of extrapolating deductions
at both activities. Other major portions of housing
maintenance includes change-of-occupancy work and preventive
maintenance. Data on these categories of work was not
collected because the change-of-occupancy work is 100%
inspected and the preventive maintenance data was not easily
summarized.
Data collected at PWC San Francisco represented a
contract period of 11 months. Data collected at Great Lakes
extended over a 24 month period. In addition to a collec-
tion of historical data, interviews were conducted with
contract administrators at both activities.
B. CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS
1. Treatment of Service Calls at Great Lakes
Service calls at Great Lakes were classified as
either emergency, urgent, or routine. The implication for
the contractor was that each required different response
times. The definitions of each category are given below
along with the required response time.
EMERGENCY CALLS—These are problems which pose an immedi-
ate danger to the occupants or have the potential to cause
further property damage (e.g., power lines down, overflow-
ing toilet) . They require contractor response within 30
minutes on a 24 hour basis.
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URGENT CALLS—These are problems which do not pose an
immediate threat to occupants or property, but would soon
inconvenience and affect the well-being of the occupants
(e.g., refrigerator not working, toilet backed up). The
contractor is required to respond within two hours of the
call.
ROUTINE CALLS—These are problems which cannot be classi-
fied as either an emergency or urgent situation (e.g.,
tile repair, binding doors) . The contractor is required
to respond within nine days and to complete the work
within 14 days.
The performance of service calls was broken down
into four performance indicators: responsiveness, quality
of work, proper classification, and proper accounting. Each
one of the performance indicators was assigned a weighting
representative of the "worth" of that portion of the job.
Performance weights must total 100%. When performance
indicators are weighted, it means that accomplishment of any
individual performance indicator earns a percent of the
service price equal to the weighting. Thus, weighting has a
direct bearing on the level of deductions to be assessed for
failure to perform. For example, the performance weighting
for emergency response is 45%. Suppose that a contractor
responded to an emergency call one hour late. Regardless of
the fact that quality work was done and the job was properly
documented, 4 5% of the price would be subject to deduction.
2 . Treatment of Service Calls at San Francisco
Service calls at San Francisco were also categorized
as emergency, urgent and routine. However the required
response times differed as follows:
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EMERGENCY CALLS—two hours during work hours, four after;
URGENT CALLS—twenty four hours;
ROUTINE CALLS—five days response, fourteen days
completion.
San Francisco also used the same four performance
indicators as Great Lakes, but did not assign weights to
them. In effect, that meant that each one was weighted
100%. A deficiency in response time, quality, or documenta-
tion would result in a total deduction being taken.
Another difference between the activities was that
San Francisco combined its service calls into three other
categories for the purpose of bidding and inspection. These
were interior, exterior and appliances. Thus, exterior work
might consist of any of the three service call types.
C. QUALITY ASSURANCE PLANS
1. Introduction
Quality Assurance Plans (QAP) are long, complex
documents which attempt to provide the activity with a
structured approach for inspecting all aspects of a contrac-
tor's performance. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
attempt to convey the contents of either activity's QAP. My





A major difference between the two plans was that
PWC Great Lakes wrote theirs initially to incorporate RESED.
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San Francisco's plan was based on the MO-327 version of
random sampling, which did not allow for extrapolation. The
result was that the QAP in San Francisco had little
resemblance to the quality assurance program which
eventually evolved. The fact that PWC San Francisco was
able to implement a workable program after some trial and
error, reinforces the wisdom of separating the QAP from the
formal contract.
3 . Critical Performance Levels
The CPLs contained in the QAP were not part of the
bid information of either contract. NAVFAC's policy then,
which has just recently changed, is that the CPL was an in-
house tool only. However, while unknown to the contractor
during the bidding process, the contractor soon became
familiar with the CPL as it formed the basis of payment
analysis and performance judgments.
The CPL assigned to service contracts in San
Francisco was 90%, while Great Lakes enforced a CPL of 97%.
San Francisco felt that a CPL in excess of 90% was too harsh
and unrealistic. The opinion at Great Lakes was that 97%
performance was realistic and had been achieved by the
departing public works force. The SCM at Great Lakes also
felt that a 97% CPL was high enough to prevent planned
noncompliance by the contractor. A possibility he thought
plausible at a CPL level of 90%.
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The actual weighted average performance or service
calls achieved at PWC San Francisco was 92.0%, as compared
to 98.1% at PWC Great Lakes. While contractor performance
is subject to many variables, including inspector
aggressiveness, the close parallel between performance
differences and CPL differences suggests a relationship.
4 . Performance Weighting
The failure of PWC San Francisco to weight the
different aspects of service call performance for payment
purposes would probably have made extrapolation unsupporta-
ble in court. This is similar to the Air Force janitorial
contract [REf. 2]] where a room could be declared unsatis-
factory and payment denied because an ashtray was not
emptied.
Not weighting performance factors also makes bidding
more difficult and transfers greater risk to the contractor.
This may have been a factor in PWC San Francisco paying a
weighted average of $55.00 per service call, while Great
Lakes paid only $33.00.
There was not enough data to support conclusively
whether or not weighting influenced contractor performance
at Great Lakes (see performance weights in Figure 5.1).
However, in emergency and urgent calls where responsiveness
and quality were closely weighted, mean performance was
within one half of a percent of each other. In the case of
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This section looks briefly at the use of inspector
resources at each activity. Any random sampling program
approved for extrapolated deductions must permit efficient
use of inspectors, with minimal administrative burden, if it
is to receive command support. Although many of the inspec-
tion procedures referred to are in the QAP, all inspection





Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the monthly level of
inspection employed at each activity over the period studied
along with the population range for each of the service
categories. It should be noted that due to the lower CPL,
inspection levels at San Francisco were far below that of
Great lakes. In fact, although the number of calls at San
Francisco are higher, they inspected less than half the
calls inspected at Great Lakes. This relationship would
suggest too great an incentive for contract administrators
to sacrifice performance requirements for the sake of saving
inspector resources.
These figures also show the potential savings
possible by combining the services into one group for
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POPULATION POPULATION SAMPLE INSPECTION
MEAN RANGE MEAN LEVEL
ROUTINE CALLS 536 391-71
3
207 39"/.
URGENT CALLS 470 331-604 163 35/i
EMERGENCY CALLS 165 110-250 97 59*/.
TOTAL 1171 950-1391 467 407.
Figure 5.2 Inspection Data at PWC Great Lakes
POPULATION POPULATION SAMPLE INSPECTION
MEAN RANGE MEAN LEVEL
INTERIOR CALLS 961 814-1070 38 97.
EXTERIOR CALLS 2S0 173-435 69 257.
APPLIANCE CALLS 192 139-229 64 347.
TOTAL 1433 1252-1669 221 157.
Figure 5.3 Inspection Data at PWC San Francisco
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inspection purposes. If the population of service calls at
San Francisco were combined into one group of 1433 calls,
the required sample size would only be 91!. Whether or not
this could reasonably be considered a homogeneous population
is subject to debate. Differences in frequency or cost is
no greater than the variation which occurs within each
service call category. The economy inherent in large
populations argues for combining work items where possible.
A look at the population ranges in Figures 5.2 and
5.3 illustrates the difficulty in estimating an appropriate
sample size. Another benefit to increasing the population
is the greater stability involved. A sample size of 91
would apply to all populations in the range of 1300-1500.
3 . Surveillance Level Switching
Both QAPs provided conditions under which surveil-
lance levels could be changed. At PWC San Francisco, the
option was not exercised for two reasons: (1) contract
administrators felt that reduced inspection levels would not
have been adequate, and (2) tight surveillance was beyond
the capacity of the inspector force.
Surveillance levels were switched as deemed appro-
priate by the SCM at PWC Great Lakes. Although the guidance
in the QAP was not strictly followed, the switching tech-
nique was effectively utilized. Even within the routine
service work category, different surveillance levels were
used for a period of time. Response time was under tight
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inspection, while quality of work was inspected under
reduced surveillance. It should be remembered that the
incentive for going to reduced inspection was much greater
at Great Lakes. Even under reduced inspection, at a 97% CPL
level, greater inspection was required than normal inspec-
tion at San Francisco.
The switching of inspection levels does present a
problem in balancing the workload. The SCM at Great Lakes
claimed that he was staffed for a normal inspection load.
When tight inspection was implemented, as it was for the
first year under routine response, it could be covered only
through the use of overtime and the shifting of inspectors
from other assignments. In my view, the only thing gained
by tightened inspection is the ability to extrapolate the
same percentages at a higher confidence level and a few more
observed deficiencies. It would seem more efficient to stay
at normal inspection for extrapolation purposes and use
planned inspections where it was necessary to prod the
contractor a little further. Planned inspections on a
limited basis can usually be done so that the incidence of
deficiencies is enhanced. Also, these extra planned
inspections would not be a firm requirement and would thus
allow extra flexibility. While deductions resulting from
planned inspections are allowed only if extrapolation does




Both activities made use of a computer program to
generate random samples. At the beginning of the month, the
computer would generate the random numbers and these would
be matched to service call chits as they came in.
The better program was in use at Great Lakes in that
it did not reguire the use of tables (see tables in Appendix
C) . Reguired input consisted of a population estimate, CPL,
surveillance level and lowest sample number. At San
Francisco only the population estimate and sample size was
reguired for input, but determining the appropriate sample
size reguired using the tables. Aside from the enhanced
possibility of making a mistake, the stratification of the
tables normally meant that reguired samples were slightly
greater than if determined directly by formula. In
addition, the San Francisco program always generated numbers
starting from one, which meant that chits needed to be
renumbered every month.
5. Sample Adjustment
The guestion of sample adjustment arises when the
actual population of services in a month reguires a
different sample than the one obtained as a result of the
prior estimate of the population. At PWC San Francisco,
this possibility was not addressed in the QAP. Lacking
clear guidance, command procedure has been to evaluate the
sample as if the population estimate had been correct. This
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is a simplifying procedure based on conserving inspector
resources. In evaluating the sampling history, this
experience has been justified. Due to the relatively large
samples involved, the lowest being appliances at a mean of
64 inspections per month, little change in confidence levels
would have been gained by doing additional sampling. There
was not time where an adjustment could have resulted in
extrapolation
.
The procedure written for PWC Great Lakes was more
sophisticated, yet was unnecessary. At the end of the
month, the QAE adjusted the sample size using the computer
program. By giving it the same "seed" number, it
automatically generated a new sample which either adds a few
numbers to the previous sample or deletes a few. The QAE
would then either inspect the additional samples or invali-
date some already inspected for purposes of extrapolation.
It is never desirable to invalidate a sample, as this only
reduces the confidence level of the results.
As practiced, the SCM decides whether or not to do
sample adjustment based on the possibility of extrapolation.
Where the number of defects is close to the CND, he will
authorize a sample adjustment. Even this procedure is not
always prudent. Suppose the estimated population for
emergency calls is 175. At a CP1 of 97% and normal surveil-
lance, this would call for a sample size of 117 and a CND of
six. If the population turned out to be 200, it would call
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for a sample size of 127 and a CND of seven. Assuming the
original number of defects found was six, the inspector
would be sent out to sample ten more jobs in search of one
more defect. However, had extrapolation been assessed on
the basis of the original sample, the unsatisfactory deter-
mination would have been made at a confidence level of 93%.
Certainly this is good enough to ascertain unsatisfactory
performance. Assuming that the original estimate had been
made in good faith, this extrapolation would no doubt have
been upheld in court. It would appear that guidance is
necessary in this area, so that activities can make the most
intelligent use of their resources.
E. PAYMENT ANALYSIS
1. Introduction
Payment analysis at both activities was based on
general NAVFAC guidance issued early in 1984 [Ref. 24].
Each activity modified the guidance slightly to make it more
applicable to payment for service call work. This section
evaluates the methodology of taking extrapolated deductions
at each activity. The deductions which resulted are then




Figure 5.4 is an example of payment analysis for
emergency service calls at Great Lakes. The procedure
followed at San Francisco is illustrated by a reproduction
of the payment calculation for exterior maintenance in
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October, 1985. This calculation is shown in Figure 5.5.
The obvious difference between the two is that performance
weighting requires separate analysis for each performance
indicator at Great Lakes.
The wording of line "I" instructions (see Figures
5.4 and 5.5) was found to have caused problems at both
activities. Line "I", as used at Great Lakes, is identical
to NAVFAC guidance. However, the confusing instructions
caused an inspector to not extrapolate deductions when the
observed defects equaled the CND.
The instructions associated with line "I" at San
Francisco leaves no clue as to what the actions should be
when the observed defects equal the CND. In the one
instance where the situation occurred, deductions were not
extrapolated when the observed defects equaled the CND.
Contract administrators were unaware of the proper procedure
to follow in this case. Clearer instructions should advo-
cate extrapolation when the, "observe defects are equal to
or greater than the CND."
3 . Treatment of Liquidated Damages
Liquidated damages were extrapolated at both
activities (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5). The SCM at Great
Lakes justifies this action by claiming that the customer
suffers damages through the failure of the contractor to
perform. This issue remains unresolved. In their new
contracts, San Francisco will continue to extrapolate
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EXTERIOR SERVICE CALL DEDUCTIONS
A. COST OF REQUIRED SERVICES $17,309.09
B. TOTAL UNITS OF WORK 262
C. COST PER UNIT OF WORK $64.94
D. CRITICAL PERFORMANCE LEVEL (CPL) 907.
E. CRITICAL NUMBER OF DEFECTS 12.
F. SAMPLE SIZE 12
G. NUMBER OF OBSERVED DEFECTS 13
H. PERCENT OF DEFECTIVE UNITS IN SAMPLE 20 . 37.
I. DEDUCTION FOR DEFECTIVE UNITS
(1) I-f G is less than E (GXC) NA
(2) If G is more than E (HXA) $3 . 704 . 29
J. DEDUCTION FOR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES (IX 10'/.) $370.43
K. NUMBER OF RANDOM SAMPLE UNITS REWORKED 15
L. PAYMENT FOR REWORK (KXC) $974. 10
M. NUMBER OF VALIDATED CUSTOMER COMPLAINTS 7
N. COST OF CUSTOMER COMPLAINTS (MXC) $454.58
0. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES FOR CUST COMP (NX 107.) $45.46
P. CUSTOMER COMPLAINTS REWORKED *p
Q. PAYMENT FOR REWORK $129.88
R. DEDUCTIONS FOR CUST COMPLAINTS (N-O-Q) $370 . 1
6
S. TOTAL DEDUCTIONS (I+J+O+R) $4,444.38
T. PAYMENT FOR SERVICES (A-S) $13,364.21
Figure 5.5 Exterior Service Payment at PWC San Francisco
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liquidated damages, while Great Lakes will claim liquidated
damages only for work which is re-inspected.
A firm policy needs to be established for each
category of work. Where a government function is the recip-
ient of the service, as in a janitorial contract, extrapo-
lated damages may be more easily supported. This is a
different situation than attempting to assess damages for
the housing occupants 1 inconvenience. In any case, the
extrapolation of liquidated damages can be used as extra
incentive to obtain contractor compliance with the contract.
4
.
Treatment of Validated Customer Complaints
Both activities took deductions for validated
customer complaints in addition to extrapolation. This
procedure is incorrect. The extrapolation of deductions
theoretically accounts for all deficiencies which exist
outside the sample. The most advantageous way to treat
validated customer complains under the field version is to
take deductions unless the CND has been reached. As can be
seen in Figure 5.5, PWC San Francisco makes no such
distinction.
5. Deduction Data
Extrapolation occurred ten times at PWC Great Lakes
and only once at PWC San Francisco, although each lost an
additional opportunity to extrapolate when the observed
defects equaled the CND. The difference can be attributed
mainly to the lower CPL used at San Francisco. However,
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it's the potential of extrapolated deductions that is being
counted on to improve contractor performance. Greater
deductions are not being sought for their own sake. This
potential is evident by analyzing the nature of the
deductions.
A total of $19,195.00 was taken in service call
deductions over the 2 4 months evaluated. That represents
2.1% of the contracted price for these services. Forty-five
percent of those deductions, $8,694.00, were attributable to
extrapolation beyond observed defects.
While only one incident of extrapolation took place
in eleven months at San Francisco, it resulted in deductions
of $2,7 31.00 above the observed deductions. That represent-
ed 23% of the total deductions of $11,768.00. Total
deductions at San Francisco amounted to a reduction in the
contract price of 1.3%.
Thus it can be seen that a contractor certainly has
reason to avoid extrapolation. When only a small portion of
a contract is being inspected the number of observed defects
will also be small. Therefore, deductions taken for
observed defects will be minor. Where the contractor can
also expect to rework the item, there is little financial
incentive to do it right the first time. However, if
deductions are extrapolated, the final percent deducted will
more closely reflect actual performance. The impact of this
is shown graphically in the next section.
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6. Effect on Performance
It is impossible to definitively state what factors
influenced performance at each activity. One fact is that
both contractors quickly learned to avoid extrapolation.
The ten incidences of extrapolation at PWC Great lakes
occurred in the first eleven months of the contract. Seven
of those extrapolations were assessed for unsatisfactory
performance in response to routine calls. Response to
routine calls was the only area where Great Lakes experi-
enced any problems.
Figure 5.6 plots contractor performance in response
to routine calls at Great Lakes, along with the correspond-
ing percent of contract payment each month. Extrapolation
took place from June to October; and then again in December
and February. It should be noted that in these months
payment actually fell below the performance level. This is
an undesirable state of affairs from NAVFAC's point of view,
and occurred because deductions were taken for validated
customer complaints in addition to the extrapolation. Due
to the high CPL of 97%, the contractor was forced to perform
within a relatively narrow band to avoid extrapolation. In
February of 1985, for example, the CND was exceeded even
though performance was at 95.4%. The last year of the con-
tract has seen steady high performance in all service areas.
Performance at PWC San Francisco was erratic in all
service categories. Figure 5.7 plots performance in
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Figure 5.7 Performance/Payment Comparison at PWC San Francisco
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exterior maintenance, along with the corresponding percent
of contract payment each month. Except for the extrapola-
tion which occurred in the first month, performance in
exterior maintenance typified the other two work categories.
The potential of extrapolated deductions is most evident
from this plot. It can be seen that where extrapolation
took place, payment was well below performance. Again, this
is a result of taking deductions outside the sample.
However, due to the low CPL of 90%, the contractor was able
to perform at levels as low as 85.7% without exceeding the
CND. Because the level of inspection was low, large gaps
existed between payment and performance. In fact, the
closer the contractor could get to the CND without reaching
it, the greater would be his favorable gap between perform-
ance and payment. Thus, it appears that the contractor was
able to manipulate his performance to maximize payment
differential.
7. Comparison with RSED V3 .
I did a deduction analysis with the PWC San
Francisco data assuming that RSED V3 . had been in affect.
The guestionable assumption in such an analysis was that
contractor performance remained the same. This is guestion-
able because performance would have been judged unsatsifac-
tory eight times vice once, resulting in more pressure
through CDRs. In addition, the fact that payment would have
81
more closely matched performance would have provided
additional incentive.
The level of deductions under RSED V3 . would have
been $3,766.00 per month. This represents 4.7% of the
contract price and a monthly increase in total deductions
over the field method of $2,696.00. This increased deduc-
tion level would have to be paid for with increased inspec-
tions. Monthly inspections required by RSED V3 . would
represent an 81% increase from 221 inspections to 401. At
least one new inspector would have been required to cover
this requirement. The extra deductions would pay for that
new inspector only if performance did not increase!
Discrepancies between pay and performance will be
minimal at all levels under RSED V3.0. Payment will
normally be about 1% in excess of performance if this
methodology is properly applied. This will eliminate any
motivation for the contractor to underperform, as now exists
at San Francisco. However, the fact that all deductions
will be extrapolated removes a clear goal tied to the
pocketbook. That "goal" appeared effective in ensuring




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. GENERAL ISSUES
1. Need for Oversight
This study found that in a few areas, discrepancies
existed between the RSED procedures implemented at the test
activities and the intentions of NAVFAC. These discrepan-
cies occurred because of either a lack of clear guidance or
an omission on the part of the activity. Major examples
indicating a lack of communication between NAVFAC and the
activities are: (1) the failure of both activities to
extrapolate when observed defects egualed the CND, (2) the
taking of deductions in addition to extrapolation, and (3)
different approaches planned for the extrapolation of
liguidated damages.
Problems such as these must not only be anticipated
in future guidance, but incorporated into sample working
documents where possible. In addition, the potential for
misunderstandings justifies an internal command assistance
program. Evaluation of RSED plans at the EFD level would
promote uniformity and provide assistance. This simple
followup would help preclude the Air Force experience with
GAO audits. Because of the small number of activities
involved, effective oversight would not be difficult to
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implement. When correct procedures became entrenched in the
system, this special effort could be phased out.
2
.
Treatment of Sample Adjustment
The review of activity QA plans and discussion with
contract administrators indicated that the potential for
unnecessary sample adjustment was great. Current guidance
does not clearly address the issue of sample size adjust-
ment. This problem becomes even more critical under RSED
V3 . due to the monthly extrapolations and narrow sampling
requirements. Lacking statistical backgrounds, contract
administrators' actions are unpredictable. Worse than the
expedient procedure at PWC San Francisco, would be to
overcompensate
.
The analysis of the effect that sample size had on
confidence level suggests that original samples should
provide adequate basis for contract action in all but the
most extreme cases. A simple cutoff might be a minimum
sample size of 50. Where the original sample is based on a
good faith estimate and exceeds 50, no adjustment would be
necessary. Specifying a minimum confidence level of 50%
before adjustment was necessary would be another approach.
However, that would require software support to speed the
process and ensure against miscalculation.
3 Combining Homogeneous Populations
The benefits of random sampling increase exponen-
tially with population. Due to the nature of service
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contracting, strict homogeneity is almost never achieved
within any population. Where two services have the same CPL
and similar unity costs, the possibility of combining those
populations should be examined. Inspection to different
standards would not present a problem. This process would
be similar to the combination of service calls into another
category as was done at San Francisco. However, in that
case no benefits were realized because three categories were
still used. Candidates for combination should be studied
and methods promulgated to make RSED more efficient.
4 . Surveillance Levels
The wisdom of sampling at increased levels of
inspection is questionable. Tightened inspection does not
result in increased levels of extrapolation. Sample sizes
required by tightened inspection (99% confidence) are signi-
ficantly higher than normal sampling. It was done at PWC
Great lakes through the use of overtime and reassignment.
At PWC San Francisco, constrained resources prevented its
use.
Where contractor performance has been poor and
inspector resources are available, minimum levels of random
sampling should be supplemented with planned sampling. This
procedure makes use of inspector judgment to enhance the
probability of identifying defects while maintaining
extrapolation. More flexibility is gained because there is
no need to obtain a "proper" sample at the higher level.
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Future guidance should clearly document the procedures for
mixing these two QA techniques and promote its use.
5. Performance/Payment Match
Under the field version, the mismatch between
payment and performance increases with a lower CPL. While
this mismatch provides a powerful incentive to avoid
extrapolation, it appeared to result in planned nonconform-
ance at PWC San Francisco. Deductions can only act as a
motivator where payment closely follows performance.
Guidance specifications, when developed, should
include minimum CPLs. This is especially true where the
field version is in use, as inspection levels are a function
of the CPL. Activities should be required to justify lower
CPLs. This study indicates that a CPL of 90% for service
calls is too low.
6. Computer Assistance
The complexity of RSED requires computer support
over a range of operations. This support is necessary to
both reduce the administrative burden and minimize the
chance of error. Programs now exist which are close to
satisfying this need. Full service programs should include:
sample generation with flexible numbering, sample adjustment
with decision routine, payment analysis, and sample history
if appropriate for identifying planned samples.
Computer support should be a requirement for activi-
ties planning on implementing a RSED program. The high
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payback of random sampling would justify this investment.
Software issued by NAVFAC could also be designed to help
ensure uniformity in the application of RSED.
B. RSED V3.0
The proposed method of taking extrapolated deductions is
an improvement over the field version in that deductions and
inspection requirements are not a function of the CPL. It
provides a better match between payment and performance at
lower CPL levels. The sample sizes required by RSED V3 .
are approximately equal to normal sampling at a CPL of 95%
and reduced sampling at 97%. Thus, activities with a
planned CPL of 90% or less would experience a significant
increase in sample requirements.
Possible disadvantages associated with RSED V3 .
include:
(1) RSED places more emphasis on proper samples due to
monthly extrapolation.
(2) There is no clear measure of good performance which
provides financial incentive.
(3) Where contractor performance is consistently good,
there is no reduced inspection level possible because
of the need to extrapolate.
(4) Influence of customer complaints is diminished
because they cannot be used to take deductions.
(5) The addition of a payment "adjustment" is one more
complication added to the payment analysis. Rounding
procedures must be clearly addressed.
The importance of these disadvantages was not studied.
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I support NAVFAC's intentions to try RSED V3 . because
of the weakness of the field version in influencing
performance at low CPL levels. This phenomenon was demon-
strated at PWC San Francisco. However, results from the
field will have to be analyzed before a definitive statement
can be made. Interesting comparisons could be made by
shifting PWC San Francisco and PWC Great Lakes to RSED V3 .
under the same contractor.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
1. The impact of RSED V3 . on contract price and
performance.
2. Relationship between inspector aggressiveness and QA
technique. For example, if an inspector knows that
every defect identified will have ramifications beyond
its own importance, will he be less likely to document
borderline cases?
3. A cost/benefit study of RSED versus planned sampling.
4. A legal study which attempts to define the parameters
within which NAVFAC must stay when designing a RSED
program.
5. Identification of specific contractors which serve
both the Navy and Air Force under their respective
RSED programs. Compare payment and performance.




The procedure contained in this appendix is taken in
part from OFPP Pamphlet No. 4, "A Guide For Writing and
Administering Performance Statements of Work For Service
Contracts." The OFPP approach is equivalent to Air Force
inspection procedures given in AFR 400-28. A sample size
and corresponding accept/reject numbers are then determined




A. Deciding on the Acceptable Quality Level (AQL) . The AQL
is the highest number of defects per hundred, highest
percent defective or highest number of defects that can be
allowed for any service performance indicator. There are
only a limited number of AQLs listed in MIL-STD-105D but, in
virtually all cases, one will be close enough to control the
contractor's level of service.
(1) The first step in designing a sampling plan under
MIL-STD-105D is the selection of a realistic AQL. No
service can be perfectly performed.
(2) Find the closest AQL from Figure 1 and use it to
replace the original AQL on the Performance Requirement
Summary. For example, the AQL for taxi service might have
been 5 percent. This would be changed to 4 percent or 6.5
percent since 5 percent does not appear in the figure.
B. Determining the Lot Size. To determine the sample size,
the lot size must be known. The lot is how often the
contractor provides the service in a period of time.
(1) To determine the lot size, estimate the frequency
of the service to be sampled, during the period it is to be
sampled.
(2) In the case of workorders, the monthly lot size can
be estimated from historical information on file.
C. Determining the Sample Size. Use Figure 2 to identify
an appropriate sample size for a given lot size.
(1) Use the normal sample size column unless there is a
limited number of QAEs or unless the cost of an inspection
suggests the use of the medium or small sample size column.
(2) Use the medium or small sample size, if inspec-
tions for a particular service are lengthy or hinder the
contractor's ability to provide service to customers.
D. Selecting the Rejection Level. Use MIL-STD-105D to
identify the acceptance and rejection level for the sample
size (see Figure 3) . To use the figure, begin with the
known values for the AQL and the sample size.
(1) Find the selected sample size (in the sample size
column) and read across that line to the column for the
selected AQL. At that point there will either be two
numbers or an arrow pointing up or down.
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Allowable Acceptable Quality Levels
0.010 5 1.0 1
0.015 S 1.5 2
0.025 5 2.5 S
0.040 2 4.0 J
0.065 : 6.5 :
0.10 5 10. 5
0.15 5 15. 1
0.25 2 25. 2
0.40 2 40. S
0.55 2 65. 2









2-8 2 2 2
9-15 3 2 2
16-25 5 3 3
26-50 8 5 5
51-90 13 5 5
91-150 20 8 8
151-230 32 13 13
231-500 50 20 13
501-1.200 80 32 20
1,201-3,200 125 50 32
3,201-10,000 200 80 32
10,001-35.000 315 125 50
35,001-150,,000 500 200 80
150.001-500,,000 800 315 80
500,000 and over 1250 500 125
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(2) If there is an arrow, follow the direction of the
arrow until it leads to a pair of numbers. Of the two
numbers at the intersection or at the end of the arrow, the
number on the left (Ac or accept) indicates the maximum
number of defects which can occur in a sample and still
permit the total group or lot to be judged acceptable.
(3) When there is no accept or reject number for a
given sample size and AQL, following the arrow will also
cause a change in sample size. For example, with an AQL of
1.5 and a sample size of 20, the sample size would become
32.
(4) The number on the right (Re or reject) indicates
the minimum number of defects that occur in a sample which
causes the total group or lot to be judged unacceptable.
For example, suppose the sample size is determined to be 32
and the AQL has been set at 6.5 defects per hundred. Find
the number 3 2 in the sample size column and read across that
line until the AQL column for 6.5 has been reached. The two




1. Estimated number of services for month: 1000
2. AQL: 6.5 percent
3. Normal inspection desired
Determined from the tables:
1. Sample size: 80
2. Accept number: 10
3. Reject number: 11
It should be noted for this example that even though the
activity has specified 6.5% defective as satisfactory
performance, it will accept 10 defective work units out of a
sample of 80!. This equates to 12.5% of the sample being
defective.
From Figure 4 it can be seen that if the actual level of
defects present were 8.0%, the probability of acceptance
would be 95%. This equates to a producer (contractor) risk
of 5%. At the same time, even if the actual level is as
high as 11%, it will still be accepted 75% of the time.
Thus consumer (government) risk at that level of performance
is 75%. This represents a large bias in favor of the
contractor.
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CHART C-G - OPERATING CHARACTERISTIC CURVES FOR NORMAL-TIGHTENED SINGLE SAMPLING SCHEMES
rtac -rr or lots
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APPENDIX B
MO-3 27 RANDOM SAMPLING PROCEDURES
This appendix is an excerpt from the current NAVFAC MO-
327 entitled "Service Contracts: Specifications and
Surveillance." It represents the NAVFAC guidance for random
sampling prior to the field testing of extrapolated deduc-
tions. The MO-327 is presented here to illustrate the
limited random sampling guidance available to activities
planning to begin a random sampling program. Along with an
explanation of random sampling, this appendix includes
inspection tables and a procedure to generate random
numbers
.
When NAVFAC has finalized their procedure for implement-
ing extrapolated deductions Navy-wide, the guidance will
appear in a new MO-327.
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RANDOM SAMPLING
1. GENERAL . Random sampling is a surveillance method based
on statistical theory. The key element of random sampling
is that each and every occurrence of work has an equal
chance of being evaluated. In order to achieve the desired
end results, knowledge of the Contractor's overall
performance based on evaluation of only part of the work,
surveillance by random sampling must be applied properly.
Key elements of random sampling are:
a. Sample size is specified for a given population to
achieve a predetermined level of statistical accuracy.
b. The sample of work occurrences selected for
evaluation must be selected by a random process in which
each occurrence has equal chance for selection.
c. Once an evaluation schedule has been established, it
must be followed through the surveillance period (i.e.,
monthly schedules)
.
d. Surveillance data gathered by other methods (i.e.,
customer complaints and unscheduled inspections) can not be
combined with data gathered by random sampling.
e. Assessment of the Contractor's overall performance,
projected from the observed condition of the sample, will
always have the potential to be in error. Statements as to
overall performance should be stated as "The Contractor's
overall defect rate is in excess of X %. " (Where "X"
equals the observed defect rate minus one half the AQL—ex.
ODR (9.2%) - 1/2 AQL (10%) = 4.2%.)
2. MECHANICS OF RANDOM SAMPLING . Random sampling is a
structured approach based on statistics to contract
surveillance. As such, there is a set procedure in its
application. The mechanics of applying random sampling are
as follows.
3. POPULATION . The total number of work occurrences for a
given function that are to be performed during the surveil-
lance period must be known or accurately estimated. The
Inventory of Service Worksheet is used to determine popula-
tion size.
a. When work is scheduled, population size is easy to
determine.
Example: Activity X has 80 dumpsters, 70 are
emptied weekly and 10 are emptied twice a week. The
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population, total number of work occurrences per month, is
360 (70 x 4) + (10 x 4 2)
.
b. When work is unscheduled, population size must be
estimated.
Example: The number of service requests for the














The average number of service calls per month has been 319
(1914/6) . This would be the expected population for service
calls for next month unless there is some known reason to
expect a change.
4. SAMPLE SIZE . Sample size requirements are based on AQL,
population size, and level of surveillance. Sample size
tables are used to determine sample size. Tables for normal
surveillance, reduced surveillance, and increased surveil-
lance are attached.
a. Select the table with the desired level of surveil-
lance (Tables I, II, or III).
b. Select the column with the required AQL (.05, .10,
.15, .20, or .25)
.
c. Select the row that is closest to the population
size, preferably the next largest entry.
d. The number indicated by the row and column selection
is the sample size required for surveillance in one surveil-
lance period.
(1) Daily surveillance requirements will be deter-
mined by dividing the required period's sample size by the
number of days that surveillance is to be conducted.
(2) Weekly surveillance requirements will be
determined by dividing the required sample size by the
number of weeks in a period.
(3) When computing weekly or daily sample sizes,
always round up to the next whole number (e.g. , 4 5 monthly
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samples required and 20 work days per month results in a
daily sample size of 3 - (45/20) = 2.25 and rounded up
results to 3)
.
5. Sample Selection . The final thing to be decided in
sampling is how the sample will be drawn. The objective in
the method is to insure that the sample is random (that is,
that all services have an equal chance of being selected)
.
To achieve random selection, use a random numbers table as
explained in the following examples. (A random numbers
table, Table IV, is attached) . Most items will fall into
one of these examples.
a. Use of The Random Numbers Table . The random numbers
in Table IV are arranged in groups of two.
(1) To use the table, begin by picking at random a
group of numbers on any page of the table. This is usually
done by closing the eyes and pointing with a pencil or
finger to some initial group.
(2) To identify additional random numbers, follow a
pattern. Go along a given line to its end and then along
the next line to its end and so on through the table until
enough numbers have been selected or until the table ends.
(3) If the table ends and there are still more
numbers to select, go back to the beginning of the table and
continue using the same pattern. Use various patterns
alternately, for example, use lines for one sample, use
columns for the next sample, and use a diagonal pattern for
the third sample.
b. How To Use the Random Numbers Table To Identify a
Random Sample of Consecutively Numbered Work orders .
Suppose one has to identify a random sample of 97 work
orders for evaluation. (Sample size is based on a
population of 319 using normal surveillance.) This can be
done at the beginning of the month (before the work orders
are written) or at the end of the month.
(1) If there are, or might be, 319 consecutively
numbered work orders to select from, then one begins by
listing the lowest work order number (known or projected)
This cold be $001, or possibly 443, or any other sequen-
tially assigned number. List the highest work order number
(known or projected); in this case, it could be #319 or 762.
For this example, use work orders numbered #443 to 762.
(a) Select 97 three digit numbers from Table IV
using a consistent pattern.
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(b) If random numbers selected are not between
443 and 762, discard the number outside the designated range
and select a new number.
(2) For example, using the initial entry on Table
IV we would select number 441. This number is too low. The
next number, going down the column, is 343 again too low.
The third number selected is 749. This number falls in the
range of work order number (443-762) subject to inspection.
So work order number 749 is selected to be inspected. The
next work order number selected is 523.
(3) This process would be continued until three
work orders are selected.
c. How To Use The Random Numbers Table To Identify A
Random Sample From A Group of Items . If a number of items
need to be sampled that are not consecutively numbered, the
simplest solution is to list the identifiers, for all the
items in a column, on a piece of lined paper.
(1) Next, number the lines consecutively, beginning
with the number one. Now use the random number table to
draw the sample from the line numbers. A selected line
number leads to the identifier located on that line, and
that identifier tells which item to sample. For example, if
one chooses to sample a set of work orders with attached
sales slips, one is not going to have to have a set of
consecutively numbered work orders because not every work
order has a sales slip attached.
(2) List the work orders with sales slips in a
column, number each line in the column, and randomly select
enough line numbers to make up the sample.
d. How To Use The Random Numbers Table To Identify a
Random Samples of Days . Suppose one wants to identify four
days in the month on which to sample something. The days of
the month can be numbered 01 to 31 (or less, as
appropriate)
.
(1) It is best to use a starting point different
from the one used in the previous example. For the purpose
of this example, it is being used again.
(2) One can move down the column from number to
number until the first number between 01 and 31 is spotted.
In this case, it is 22. Thus the 22nd day of the month is
selected for sampling.
(3) Continuing in this fashion, one discovers that
11 is the next number selected. This number is disregarded.
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Proceed in this manner until the four days for sampling have
been identified. In our example, the 4 days selected would
be 22, 11, 10 and 24.
(4) If it is not desirable to sample on weekends,
discard those days selected that happen to fall on a weekend
and continue that selection until the proper number of days
has been selected.
e. How To use the Random Numbers Table To Identify a
Random Sample of Times of Day . If one wants to select
random times of day to sample a service such as taxi or bus
service, use the 24 hour clock.
(1) If there are any constraints during each 24-
hour period, take them into consideration. For example,
suppose that base bus service operates between 0700 and
2300. Convert these times to minutes (e.g., 0700 = 0, 0410
= 130, 1215 = 315, etc.). Again, using Table IV and
selecting three digit numbers and proceeding across the line
from the initial number, one comes to 441, or 1421 hrs, as
the first random time.
(2) The next random number is 343, or 124 3 hrs.
The number is good and so one schedules an observation for
1243 hrs.
(3) Proceed in this manner until the desired number
of sample times have been identified.
f
.
How To Insure Variety in the Use of the Random
Numbers Table . The use of variety in the random number
table ensures that detectable patterns do not occur.
(1) Success in using the tables requires
consistency but also variety. The above information should
ensure that the tables are properly used and that the sample
is randomly drawn.
g. Other Random Numbers Generating Methods . The use of
a hand held calculator with a random number generating capa-
bility is an alternative to the use of random numbers table.
Using this type of calculator the QAE would enter the
minimum value and maximum value and numbers generated would
always be within the desired range.
102
SAMPLE SIZE REQUIREMENTS TOR RTDUGZJ SURVEILLANCE
(SURVEILLANCE LEVEL I)
POPULATION AQL
si:e .05 .10 .15 .20 .:s
so 31 21 16 11 9
75 34 25 17 13 10
100 44 27 18 13 10
125 49 28 19 14 10
150 52 30 20 14 10
175 55 30 20 14 10
200 57 31 20 14 11
225 59 32 20 14 11
250 60 32 21 14 11
275 61 32 21 15 11
300 63 33 21 15 11
32S 64 33 21 15 11
350 64 33 21 15 11
375 65 33 21 15 11
400 66 34 21 15 11
425 67 34 21 15 11
450 67 34 21 IS 11
475 68 34 21 15 11
500 68 34 21 15 11
550 69 34 22 13 11
600 70 34 22 15 11
650 70 35 22 15 11
700 71 35 22 15 11
750 71 35 22 15 11
800 72 35 22 15 11
850 72 35 22 15 11
900 73 35 22 15 11
950 73 35 22 IS 11
1000 73 35 22 15 11
1100 74 35 22 15 11
1200 74 35 22 15 11
L300 74 36 22 15 11
1400 75 36 22 IS 11
1500 75 36 22 15 11
1600 75 36 22 15 11
1700 75 36 22 IS 11
1300 76 36 22 15 11
1900 76 36 22 15 11
2000 76 36 22 15 11
2500 76 36 22 15 11
3000 77 36 22 IS 11
3500 77 36 22 15 11
4000 77 36 22 15 11
4500 77 36 22 15 11
5000 78 36 22 15 11
6000 78 36 22 15 11
7000 78 36 22 15 11
3000 78 36 22 15 11
9000 78 36 22 15 11
10000 78 36 22 IS 11
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SAMPLE SI2E REQUIREMENTS FOR NORMAL SURVEILLANCE
(SURVEILLANCE LEVEL II)
POPULATION AQL
SIZE .05 .10 • IS .20 .25
SO 43 37 32 27 23
75 60 49 40 32 27
100 76 58 46 37 29
125 89 66 51 40 31
150 101 72 54 42 32
175 111 78 57 43 33
200 121 82 60 45 34
225 129 36 62 46 35
250 137 89 63 47 35
275 144 92 65 48 36
300 151 95 66 48 36
325 157 97 .- 67 49 37
3S0 162 99 68 49 37
375 167 101 69 50 37
400 172 103 70 50 37
425 176 105 71 51 38
450 181 106 71 SI 38
475 184 107 72 51 38
500 188 109 72 52 38
550 195 111 73 52 38
600 201 113 74 52 39
650 206 114 75 S3 39
700 211 116 75 53 39
750 215 117 76 S3 39
300 219 118 76 54 39
850 222 119 77 54 39
900 226 120 77 54 39
950 229 121 78 54 39
1000 231 122 78 54 39
1100 236 123 78 55 40
1200 241 124 79 55 40
1300 244 125 79 55 40
1400 248 126 80 55 40
1500 251 127 80 55 40
1600 253 128 80 55 40
1700 256 128 80 55 40
1800 258 L29 81 56 40
1900 260 129 81 56 40
2000 262 130 81 56 40
2500 269 131 82
'
• 56 40
3000 274 132 82 56 41
3500 277 133 82 56 41
4000 280 134 33 57 41
4500 282 134 83 57 41
5000 284 135 33 57 41
6000 287 135 33 57 41
7000 289 136 83 S7 41
3000 290 136 34 57 41
9000 291 136 94 S7 41
13000 292 137 94 57 41
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SAMPLE SIZE REQUIREMENTS POR INCREASE) SURVEILLANCE
(SURVEILLANCE LEVEL III)
POPULATION AQL
SIZE .05 .10 .15 .20 .25
50 47 43 39 35 31
75 67 59 52 46 39
100 86 74 63 54 45
125 104 87 72 60 50
150 121 98 80 65 53
175 136 108 86 69 56
200 151 116 92 73 58
225 164 124 97 75 60
250 177 132 101 79 62
275 189 138 105 81 63
300 201 144 108 83 64
325 211 ISO 111 85 65
350 222 155 114 86 66
375 231 159 116 88 67
400 241 164 119 89 68
425 249 168 121 90 69
450 258 172 123 91 69
475 266 175 124 92 70
500 273 178 126 93 70
550 288 184 129 95 71
600 301 189 132 96 72
650 313 194 134 97 73.
700 324 198 136 98 73
750 334 202 138 99 74
800 344 206 139 100 74
850 352 209 141 101 75
900 361 212 142 131 75
950 368 214 143 102 75
1000 376 217 144 103 76
1100 389 221 146 103 76
1200 401 225 148 104 77
1300 411 228 149 105 77
1400 421 231 150 106 77
1500 429 234 151 106 77
1600 437 236 152 107 78
1700 444 238 153 107 78
1800 451 240 154 107 78
1900 457 241 155 108 78
2000 462 243 155 108 78
2500 485 249 158 109 79
3000 501 253 159 110 80
3500 513 256 161 111 80
4000 523 259 161 111 30
4500 530 260 162 111 80
5000 537 262 163 112 80
6000 546 264 164 112 31
7000 554 266 164 112 31
8000 S59 267 165 113 81
9000 563 268 16$ 113 31
13000 567 269 165 113 31
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SHORT TABL2 OF RANDOM NUMBERS
44 19 IS 32 S3 55 87 77 33 29 45 00 31
34 39 80 62 24 33 31 67 28 11 34 79 26
74 97 80 30 65 07 71 30 01 84 47 45 89
22 14 61 60 36 38 33 71 13 33 72 08 16
40 03 96 40 03 47 24 60 09 21 21 18 00
S2 33 76 4-4 56 IS 47 75 78 73 78 19 87
37 59 20 40 93 17 82 24 19 90 80 87 32
U 02 55 57 48 84 74 36 22 67 19 20 15
10 33 79 26 34 54 71 33 89 74 68 48 23
67 59 28 25 47 89 11 65 65 20 42 23 96
98 50 75 20 09 18 54 34 68 02 54 87 23
24 43 23 72 80 64 34 27 23 46 IS 36 10
39 91 63 18 38 27 10 78 38 84 42 32 00
74 62 19 67 54 18 28 92 33 69 98 96 74
91 03 35 60 81 16 61 97 25 14 78 21 22
42 57 66 76 72 91 03 63 48 46 44 01 33
06 . 36 63 06 15 03 72 38 01 58 25 37 66
92 70 96 70 89 80 87 14 25 49 25 94 62
91 08 88 S3 52 13 04 82 23 00 26 36 47
68 85 97 74 47 53 90 05 90 14 87 48 25
59 54 13 09 13 30 42 29 s: 03 24 64 12
39 18 32 69 33 46 58 19 34 03 59 23 97
67 43 31 09 12 60 19 57 63 78 11 80 10
61 75 37 19 56 90 7S 39 03 56 49 92 72
73 10 91 11 00 63 19 63 74 58 69 03 51
93 23 71 58 09 78 08 03 07 71 79 32 2<
37 55 48 82 63 89 92 59 14 72 19 17 22
62 13 11 71 17 23 29 25 13 35 33 35 07
29 89 97 47 03 13 20 36 22 45 59 98 64
16 94 as 32 89 07 17 30 29 89 89 80 98
04 53 10 59 75 12 98 34 60 93 68 16 87
95 71 43 68 97 18 85 17 13 08 00 SO 77
86 05 39 14 35 48 63 13 36 57 09 62 40
59 30 60 10 41 31 00 69 63 77 01 89 94
05 . 45 35 40 54 03 98 96 76 27 77 34 30
71 85 17 74 66 27 85 19 55 56 51 36 • 48
80 20 32 30 98 00 40 92 57 51 52 33 14
13 50 78 02 73 39 66 32 01 28 67 51 75
67 92 65 41 45 36 77 96 46 21 14 39 56
72 56 73 44 26 04 62 81 15 35 79 26 99
28 86 85 64 94 11 53 78 45 36 34 45 91
69 57 40 80 44 94 60 82 94 93 98 01 48
71 20 03 30 79 25 74 17 78 .34 54 45 04
89 98 55 98 22 45 12 49 82 71 57 33 28
58 74 32 81 14 02 01 05 77 94 65 57 70
50 54 73 81 91 07 31 26 25 45 49 61 22
49 33 72 90 10 20 65 28 44 63 95 86 75
11 85 01 43 65 02 85 69 56 88 34 29 64
34 22 46 41 84 74 27 02 57 77 47 93 72
42 64 64 58 22 75 31 74 91 48 46 13 34
34 05 72 90 44 27 78 22 07 62 17 35 34
23 39 94 00 80 55 31 63 27 91 70 74 13
J4 90 51 27 61 34 63 87 44 13 SO 56 48
106
51 29 48 30 93 45 66 29 OS 86 *2 35 40
73 73 57 68 36 33 51 36 9e 47 48 02 52
03 42 05 32 55 02 74 59 34 24 49 79 17
23 75 33 42 00 92 53 IT 13 ^c 54 89 5o
73 23 39 07 17 49 13 81 ;e 52 25 70 05
73 11 17 41 64 20 30 39 87 64 37 93 35
96 35 05 43 36 98 29 97 93 37 06 30 92
98 63 21 59 69 76 02 52 31 62 47 60 34
97 92 00 04 • 94 50 05 75 32 70 80 35 35
72 11 68 25 08 95 31 79 11 79 54 05 25
47 26 37 80 39 19 36 41 02 00 S3 62 28
80 59 55 OS 02 16 13 17 54 43 56 19 56
41 29 28 76 49 74 39 SO 78 26 15 41 39
48 75 64 69 61 06 38 44 04 ca 34 30 07
44 76 51 52 41 59 01 11 05 45 11 43 15
60 40 31 84 59 43 28 10 01 65 52 07 79
83 05 59 61 31 02 65 47 47 70 39 74 17
30 22 65 97 15 70 04 39 81 7a 54 94 37
33 42 95 27 52 87 47 12 52 54 62 43 23
13 38 60 36 S3 56 77 06 69 03 89 91 24
19 61 04 40 33 12 06 78 91 97 38 95 51
90 20 03 64 96 60 48 01 95 44 84 69 2S
68 57 92 57 11 84 44 01 33 66 53 89 64
94 31 55 87 73 81. 58 56 42 36 25 36 S3
02 49 14 34 03 52 09 20 60 11 50 46 56
58 45 83 72 SO 46 LI 50 46 92 45 25 97
^ i 48 22 23 08 32 28 87 08 74 79 91 08
27 12 43 32 03 60 19 02 70 88 71 it 33
88 20 60 86 08 64 SO 44 34 54 24 35 23
85 77 32 92 32 44 40 47 10 38 22 52 42
29 96 55 31 99 73 23 40 07 64 54 44 99
21 66 33 97 47 58 42 44 88 09 28 53 06
36 70 15 74 43 62 69 82 30 77 23 77 57
28 22 25 94 30 62 95 48 98 23 86 38 51
10 68 36 87 81 16 77 30 19 36 SO 57 69
60 77 69 60 74 22 OS 77 17 77 42 59 75
78 64 99 37 03 18 03 36 69 50 59 15 09
25 79 39 42 84 18 70 39 42 48 55 <?4 31
59 18 70 41 74 60 38 41 20 00 IS 59 •93
51 60 65 65 63 78 69 24 41 65 36 10 34
10 32 00 93 35 48 15 70 11 77 33 CI 34
32 91 04 02 95 63 75 74 69 69 Gl 34 31
92 13 05 ' 57 23 06 26 23 08 66 16 ti 75
28 81 37 78 16 05 57 12 46 22 00 37 78
67 39 23 71 15 08 82 64 37 29 01 20 46
72 OS 42 67 98 41 67 44 28 71 45 08 19
47 76 05 83 03 34 32 62 83 27 48 33 09
19 34 60 46 18 41 23 74 73 51 72 90 40
52 95 32 80 64 75 91 98 09 40 64 39 29
99 46 79 86 53 77 78 06 62 37 48 32 71
00 78 45 13 23 32 01 09 46 36 43 66 37
15 35 20 60 97 48 21 41 84 22 72 77 99
91 83 67 91 44 83 43 25 56 33 23 80 99
53 27 86 50 76 93 96 35 68 4S 37 93 47
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APPENDIX C
SAMPLING TABLES USED IN THE FIELD TEST
This appendix contains tables reproduced from those
utilized at each activity. The first group of tables were
used by PWC San Francisco at the CPL = 90% level. Great
Lakes used the second group of tables at the CPL = 97%
level. Both groups of tables were generated from the same
formula. The tables provide graphic illustration of the
effect that the CPL, surveillance level and population have
on the sample size and CND.
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CHD/SS UJ3LE
CEITICAL BUMBEB OF DEFECTIVES (CSD) /SAMPLE SIZE (.SS)


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CRITICAL WUH2ER OF DEFECTIVES (CUD) /SAMPLE SIZE (SS)










9SX 90* 85X 80*







































































































































































































































































































CRITICAL NUMBER OF DEFECTIVES (CND) /SAMPLE SIZE (SS)
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































CRITICAL NUMBER OF DEFECTIVES (.CUD) /SAMPLE SIZE (SS)
Tightened Surveillance (Page 1 of 2 )
> >
> UNITS >






CRITICAL PERFORMANCE LEVEL (CPL)
95* 9OX 35* 80*









































































































































































































































































> 28/341 > 29/178 > 28/116 > 27/83 > 25/63
> 29/353 > 30/181 > 29/117 > 27/84 > 25/63
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OTO/SS TABLE
CRITICAL HUMBER OF DEFECTIVES (.CUD) /SAMPLE SIZE (SS)

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































997. 987. 977. 967. 957.
M 1 / 4* a / 43 2 / 40 3 / aa 3 / 3*
79 3 / 47 a / *1 3 / :19 4 / 91 4 / 47
100 3 1 7 3/7* 4 / •4 4 / »1 3 / 3*
129 3 / 109 3 / *0 4 i1 7* 3 / 70 * / *a
190 3 / 123 4 / 102 3 / aa * / 77 « / *a
173 3 / 13* 4 / 113 3 / »* » / 83. « / 73
aoo 3 / 193 9 / 123 * / 103 * / aa 7/77
239 3 / 1*7 9 / 133 * / 104 7 / *3 7 ,i ao
390 3 / iai 9 / 141 * / 119 7 / *7 7 ,i as
379 4 / 1*3 9 / 1441 » / 130 7 / 100 7 / a*
300 4 1 309 * / 139 7 / 13* 7 / 103 a / aa
339* 4 1 317 * / 1*3 7 / 12* 7 / 10* a / *o
390 4 1 320 * / t*a 7 / 133 • / to* a / *3
3T3 4 f 230 * / 173 7 / 13* a / 111 a / **
4O0 9 1 3*3 * / na 7 / 13* a / 113 a / *9
439 9 / 337 * / 1*3 7 / i4a / 119 a / *7
490 3 / 24* 7 / laa / 144 • /I17 • / *o
479 3 / 279 7 / i*a / 147 • / na » / **
900 3 / 2*3 7 / IV* l 14* • / tao » / 100
990 3 / 24« 7 / 303 • 1 193 » / 133 * / 10a
AOO * / 313 7 / 310 a / 137 » / 123 / 103
*30 * / 339 • / 313 • / 1*0 » / 137 * / 109
700 * / 337 • / 331 a / 1*3 / 13* » / 10*
790 * / 340 • / 233 » / 1** » / 130 » / 107
aoo * / 39* • / 230 / i*a » / 13a » / toa
90 7 1 3»* / 234 * / 170 • / 133 * / 10*
•00 7 / 37* • / 237 * / 173 » / 134 » / 110
90 7 / aa* • / 241 » / 174 / taa * / no
10O0 7 / 3*4 / a*4 V > ' 179 * / 13* 10 / HI
MOO 7 / 1 40* 4.' / 24* * / i7a * / taa 10 / 111
1300 7 y 423 1 ' / 294 * / 1 1BI 10 / 13* 10 / 113
13O0 i 434 1 ' / 390 * / 183 10 / 141 10 / 114
1400 • i 4«« 1 / 3*a 10 / ia9 io / Ma 10 / 119
19O0 i 494 1 ' / 2*9 10 / ta* 10 / 143 10 / 119
1*00 i 4*3 4 1 / 2*a 10 / taa 10 / 1*4 10/11*
1700 • i 47| 1 1 / 271 to / la* 10 / 144 10 / 11*
IOO0 • i 47« 1 / 273 io / i*o 10 / 149 10 / 117
t«O0 • / 433 « / 279 10 / i*i 10 / 14* 10 / 117
aooo * i 4*1 10 / 277 10 / i*a 10 / 14* 10 / 110
39O0 » / 91* 10 / 209 10 / i** 10 / 140 10 / II*
3000 * / 939 10 / 2*1 10 / >»• 10 / 190 io / tao
3SO0 * / 94* 10 / 2*9 10 / aoo 10 / 191 to / iai




N 99*/. 987. 97*/. 967. 93X
30 » / 40 3 / 44 3 / 44 3 / 43 4/40
79 3 / ro 3 / 44 4 / 43 4 / 90 9/99
I0O 3 / 41 3/04 4/70 3 '73 * / 47
123 3 / 113 4 / 101 3/43 k / M 7 / 70.
130 3 / 133 4 / 117 4/109 7/43 / 07
173 3 / 130 3 / 133 4 / 117 7 / 109 • / 49
aoo 3 / Mf 9 / 149 7/137 / 113 4 / 101
333 4 / ia* * / 13« 7 / 137 • / 131 4 / 107
330 4 / 303 * / 170 • / 14* 4/137 10 / 113
373 4 / >*• * / 111 • / 134 4/134 10 / 110
»0 4 / 334 7 / 143 0/1*3 10 / 134 10 / 123
333 3 / 344 7 / 303 • / 1*4 10 / 144 11 / 13*
330 3 / 3*4 7 / an 4 / 173 10 / 144 11 / 130
373 » / 3T» / 330 4 / 101 10 / 193 11 / 133
400 3 / 3*1 1 / zza 10 / 107 11 / 137 13 / 13*
433 9 / 304 / 334 10 / 143 11 / 1*1 13 / 134
430 * / 317 • / 343 10 / 147 11 / 143 13 / 14|
473 * / 33* 4 / 331 10 / 303 II / 1*4 13 / 144
3O0 4 / 341 * / 337 11 / 30* 13 / 171 13 / 14*
330 4 / 343 * / 370 11 / 314 13 / 17* 13 / 130
400 7 / 303 10 / Tta 11 / 231 13 / 101 13 / 133
430 7 / 403 10 / 3*3 13 / 53> 13 / !•* 13 / 13*
70O 7 / 4X3 10 / 303 13 / «J3 13 / 10)4 13 / 134
730 • / 441 11 / 311 13 / 334 13 / 143 14 / 1*1
•00 • / 430 11 / 31* 13 / 3*3 13 / 14* 14 / 1*4
•30 • / 474 It / 3*7 13 / 340 13 / 144 14 / 1**
«oo * / •44 11 / 334 13 / 333 14 / 303 14 / 1*7
490 4 / 304 13 / 340 13 / 33* 14 / 304 14 / 1*4
I0OO 4 / 317 13 / 347 13 / 334 14 / 30* 14 / 171
1100 • / 343 13 / 330 14 / 3** 14 / 310 13 / 173
I30O 10 / 34«> 13 / 3*4 14 / 371 14 / 314 19 / 17*
130O 10 / 9*7 13 / 377 14 / 374 13 / 317 19/170
I40O 10 / 407 13 / 313 14 / 3*0 19 / 314 13 / 174
I300 II / 433 13 / 343 14 / 3*4 19 / 331 19 / 101
1400 II / 443 14 / 340 13 / 307 19 / 333 19 r ID
I70O II / 437 14 / 404 19 1 740 13 / 333 19 / 143
iaoo 13 / 473 14 / 410 13/343 13 / 337 1* / 109
i»oo 13 / *•» 14 / 413 IS / 344 19 / 334 1* / 10*
3O0O 13 / *•* 14 / 414 13/344 19 / 330 1* / 10*
33O0 13 / 790 13 / 430 1* / 30* 1* / 339 1* / 140
3OO0 13 / 740 13 / 491 1* / 313 1* / 334 I* / 143
33O0 14 / aao 14 / 441 1* / 314 1* / 343 1* / 144




997. 987. 97% 967. 937.
90 1 / '•* 3 / 49 3 1 47 3 / 44 4/49
79 a / 73 3 / 70 4 ,'40 9 / 44 4/43
100 3 / ** 4 / *1 9 / 00 4 / •4 7 / *0
179 a / III 4 / 113 4 / lOA 7 / tot / **
190 3 / 140 9 / 131 7 7 134 / 114 « / 110
179 3 / 143 9/190 7 / 140 * / 131 10 / 133
aoo 3 / 1*3 4 / 140 • / 194 10 / 144 1It / 139
339 4 / 304 7 / IB4 * / 170 tl ./ 197 13 / 1*9
390 4 / 334 7 / 303 lO / 1*4 13 / 14* 13 / 194
3T9 4 / 344 • / 310 10 / 1*7 ta / 1*0 14 / 149
300 t / 343 / 33* It / »t* 13 / 1*0 1* / 174
339 • / X * / ** It / 333 14 / BOO 19 / 1*3
3BO • / 301 * / 343 13 / 333 14 / 30* U. / I**
779 4 / 31* 10 / 3T7 ta / 344 19 / at* 14 / 1*4
*oo 4 / 337 10 / 3*1 13 / 399 19 / 334 17 / 303
439 4 / 399 10 / 303 13 / 344 14 / 334 1* / 30*
«90 7 / 373 11 / 314 14 / 374 14 / 341 !• / 319
479 7 / 3a* 11 / 33* 14 / 3*3 17 / 34* 1* / 230
9O0 , 7 / 409 13 / 3*0 19 / 3*3 17 / 399 1* / 334
990 / 430 13/3*3 14 / 30* 1* / 347 30 / 239
400 • / 44* 13/3*3 14/333 1* / 37* SO / 344
490 * / 4** 14 / 403 17 / 337 1* / 3** at / 333
7O0 • / 930 14 / 433 1* / 390 30 / 3** 33 / 39*
790 10 1 994 IS / 43* 1* / 343 at / 307 23/344
too 10 1 9«3 19 / 49* 1* / 373 31 / 319 33/373
•9* 10 t 40* 14 / 47a 1* / 3*4 33 / 333 33 / 377
*oo 11 it 434 1* / 4«7 ao / 3*4 33 / 330 23 / 3*3
*90 11 / »>• 17 / 901 30 / 403 33 / 334 34 / 337
I0O0 13 / 449 17 / 919 3t / 4ia 23/343 34 / 3*3
IIOO 13 / 737 1* / VM> at / 4»o 34 / 393 39 / 3**
13O0 13 / 74* 1* / 943 33 / 443 2* / 343 39 / 304
13O0 14 / ao* 30/904 33 / 499 39/371 34 / 313
1400 14 / 047 - 30 / 404 33 / 447 39 / 37* a4 / 3ia
I9O0 11 / m 31 / 433 "34 / 477 34 / 3*4 37/323
i*oo 1* / *I4 31 / 430 34 / 407 34 / 3*3 27/337
1700 14 / *44J 33 / 493 39 / 4*4 34 / 3*3 37/331
tooo IT / *7* 33 / 44« 39 / 904 37 / 403 33/339
t*0O 17 / 10O7 33/44)1 34 / 913 37 / 40* 33/33*
aooo 17 / 1039 33 / 4*3 34 / 91* 37 / 413 3* / 341
3900 1* / 1194 39 / 7*9 37/947 3* / 430 3* / 393
aooo at / 1390 34/704 3* / 94* 30/443 30/343
39O0 aa / 1330 37 / 014 3* / 9*4 30 / 493 30/34*
4000 33 / 13*4 30 / 03* 30/9*4 30 / 440 31/373
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APPENDIX D
RSED V3.0 TABLES AND PAYMENT ANALYSIS
This appendix contains inspection tables and deduction
adjustments (deltas) for RSED V3.0. That is followed by a
sample payment analysis. The material within this appendix
has been reproduced from preliminary NAVFAC guidance on the
proposed method [Ref. 19]. Interesting features are the
enhanced inspection requirements and narrowly defined
population ranges. There is no CND because extrapolation
takes place in the event of any defect.
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RSED V3.0 - Table oi Sample Sizes
For Normal Sampling Levels
07-07-1966
Sample sizes are -for the indicated monthly population:






























































































































































































RSED V3.0 - Table o-f Sample Sizes
For- Normal Sampling Levels
07-07-1986
Sample sizes are for the indicated monthly population:
Population range - Sample Size Population range - Sample Size
296 - 290 124 291 -
297 - 302 126 303 -
309 - 313 128 314 -
321 - 326 130 327 -
333 - 339 132 340 -
346 - 352 134 353 -
360 - 366 136 367 -
375 - 381 ... 138 382 -
390 - 397 140 398 -
406 - 414 142 415 -
423 - 431 144 432 -
441 - 450 146 451 -
460 - 469 148- 470 -
480 - 490 150 491 -
502 - 512 152 513 -
524 - 535 154 536 -
549 - 560 156 561 -
575 - 587 158 588 -
602 - 616 160 617 -
632 - 647 162 648 -
664 - 680 164 681 -
698 - 716 166 717 -
736 - 754 168 755 -
776 - 796 170 797 -
820 - 842 172 843 -
868 - B93 174 894 -
921 - 948 176 949 -
979 - 1009 178 1010 -
1043 - 1077 180 1078 -
1115 - 1153 182 1154 -
1195 - 1238 184 1239 -
1286 - 1335 186 1336 -
1389 - 1445 1B8 1446 -
1508 - 1573 190 1574 -
1645 - 1721 192 1722 -
1806 - 1896 194 1897 -
1998 - 2107 196 2108 -
2229 - 2363 198 2364 -
2515 - 2684 200 2685 -
2877 - 3095 202 3096 -
3349 - 3643 204 3644 -
3991 - 4407 206 4408 -
^916 - 5549 208 5550 -
6362 - 7439 210 7440 -
8941 - 11173 212 11174 -
14848 - .22020 214 22021 -
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R5ED V3.0 - Table o-f Adjustment Factors
07-07-1986
FOR DEFECT RATE
OVER '/. - THRU "/.
ADJUSTMENT
FACTOR 7.
FOR DEFECT RATE ADJUSTMENT
OVER 7. - THRU 7. FACTOR 7.
UP TO - 1.0 0. 46
2.0 - 3.0 0.78
4.0 - 5.0 1.00
6.0 - 7.0 1.17
8.0 - 9.0 1.31
10.0 - 11.0 1.44
12.0 - 13.0 1.54
14.0 - 15.0 1.64
16.0 - 17.0 1. 72
18.0 - 19.0 1.80
20.0 - 21.0 1.87
22.0 - 23.0 1.93
24.0 - 25.0 1.99
26.0 - 27.0 2.04
28.0 - 29.0 2.08
30.0 - 31.0 2. 12
32.0 - 33.0 2.16
34.0 - 35.0 2. 19
36.0 - 37.0 2.22
38.0 - 39.0 2.24
40.0 - 41.0 2.26
42.0 - 43.0 2.27
44.0 - 45.0 2.28
46.0 - 47.0 2.29
48.0 - 49.0 2.29
1.0 - 2.0 0.64
3.0 - 4.0 0. 90
5.0 - 6.0 1 .09
7.0 - 8.0 1 .24
9.0 - 10.0 1 . 38
11.0 - 12.0 1. 49
13.0 - 14.0 1.59
15.0 - 16.0 1 .68
17.0 - 18.0 1 .76
19.0 - 20.0 1.84
21.0 - 22.0 1 .90
23.0 - 24.0 1.96
25.0 - 26.0 2.01
27.0 - 28.0 2.06
29.0 - 30.0 2. 10
31.0 - 32.0 2. 14
33.0 - 34.0 2.17
35.0 - 36.0 2.20
37.0 - 38.0 2.23
39.0 - 40.0 2.25
41.0 - 42.0 2.26
43.0 - 44.0 2.28
45.0 - 46.0 2.29
47.0 - 48.0 2.29
49.0 - 50.0 2.29
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WHERE SOME DEFICIENCIES ARE NOT REWORKED WITHIN ALLOTTED TIME
a. Price for specified services
b. Population of services this period being billed
c. Price per service
d. Number of services sampled
e. Number of sampled services rejected
f. Observed defect (reject) rate [(e/d)xl00j
g. Adjustment factor Note 1
h. Deductible defect rate (f - g) Note 2
i. Extrapolated defects [Whole number portion of (h x b)/100]
j. Defects observed outside the sample Note 3
k. Acceptable rework completed
1. Net number of services to deduct (i - k) Note 2
m. Deduct for unsatisfactory services (c x 1)
n. Liquidated damages (10% of c x k) Note 4
o. Other adjustments (- for deduct) Note 5
p. Total Payment (a - m - n _ o)
Notes-: 1. Adjustment factor varies with observed defect rate.
2. Cannot be less than zero (0)
3. Defects observed outside the sample will not be used as
a basis for extrapolation but shall be considered in
calculation of payment for satisfactory rework.
4. Liquidated damages calculated as appropriate in accordance
with contract provisions.
5. This could include a deduction for work performed by Government
or other forces or payment for rework from a prior billing period
provided it would not have resulted in less than zero Net



















1. Naval Facilities Engineering Command, NAVFAC P-68,
Contracting Manual , July 1985.
2. Helwig, F. , Newlin, K. , and Norton, M. , Analysis of the
Make or Buy Decision Criteria for Commercial/Industrial
Type Activities , U.S. Army Procurement Research Office,
Fort Lee, Virginia, 1976.
3. 100 Congressional Record 567 (1954). In "Contracting
Out: A Case for Realistic Contract vs In-House
Decision-Making," Military Law Review , Vol. 49, p. 4,
July 1970.
4. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 (Revised),
Subject: Performance of Commercial Activities , August
1983.
5. Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Public Works
Manual , Civil Engineers Officer School, June 1981.
6. Chief of Naval Operations, Policy Letter 731241, March
1980.
7. Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Letter
152.6/DCC, Subject: Commercial Activities Program
Correspondence . 10 March 1983.
8. Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Maintenance Manual
MO-327, Service Contracts: Specification and Surveil-
lance , November 1982.
9. Duncan, Acheson, Quality Control and Industrial
Statistics , 4th ed. , Homewood, Illinois: Richard Irwin
Inc., 1974.
10. Dodge, H.F., "Notes on the Evolution of Acceptance
Sampling Plans Part 1," Journal of Quality Technology ,
April 1969.
11. Freeman, H.A. , "Statistical Methods for Quality
Control," Mechanical Engineering . April 1937, p. 261.
12. Dodge, H.F., "Notes on the Evolution of Acceptance
Sampling Plans Part 2," Journal of Quality Technology .
July 1969.
123
13. Statistical Research Group, Columbia University, Tech-
niques of Statistical Analysis . New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co. , 1947.
14. Dodge, H.F., "Notes on the Evolution of Acceptance
Sampling Plans Part 3," Journal of Quality Technology
.
October 1969.
15. Halpern, Siegmund, The Assurance Sciences , Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-hall Inc., 1978.
16. Department of the Air Force Regulation 400-28, Vol. 1,
Logistics: Base Level Service Contracts . 1979.
17. Air Force Audit Agency, Quality Assurance over Base-
Level Service Contracts , Report of Audit #5076510, 16
April 1986.
18. Hildebrand, David, Statistical Thinking for Managers .
Boston, Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, 1983.
19. Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command Policy
Letter 10A1/0914C, Random Sampling for Extrapolated
Deductions (RSED) V3 . . 24 July 1986.
20. Allen, D.
,
Internal NAVFAC Memorandum 0118C, Proposed
Random Sampling Procedure for Service Contracts . 13
January 1986.
21. Federal Acquisition Regulations, Subpart 52.246-4, April
1984.
22. Decisions of the Comptroller General, "Environmental
Asceptic Services Administration and Larson Building
Care Inc., February 28, 1986," (B207771) , Vol. 62,
Washington, D.C., 1984.
23. Federal Acquisition Regulations, Subpart 12.202, January
1965.
24. Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command Letter
1001A/CM, Facilities Support Contract Surveillance Using
Random Sampling , February 15, 1984.
25. Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals Case 10,772,
Vol. 68-1 B.C. A., 1968.
26. Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals Case 25,618,




Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145
Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002
Commanding Officer (Code C35) 1
Naval School, Civil Engineer Corps Officers
Naval Construction Battalion Center
Port Hueneme, California 93043
Robert J. Maholchic 1
4 Fort Hill Park
Oxford, New York 13830
Alyce Kuether 1
2 4 007 Vanowen St.
Canoga Park, California 91307













in Navy maintenance ser-
vice contracts.







in Navy maintenance ser-
vice contracts.

